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I. INTRODUCTION
On July 1, 1977, the Montana Rules of Evidence became effec-
tive by Supreme Court Order No. 12729' for all trials held after that
date. With a few major exceptions, the Rules embody generally
accepted principles of the law of evidence. The transition to their
use should not have proven traumatic.
An understanding of the history of the Rule drafting process is
helpful to an analysis of their substance. The Montana Commission
on Rules of Evidence began as a committee of the Montana Bar
Association. In April of 1974 its members were appointed to the
Commission by the supreme court to formulate Rules of Evidence."
The Commission obtained funding from the Montana Board of
Crime Control with matching funds from the supreme court. Its
work commenced on July 1, 1974, when this author began work as
the reporter for the Commission.
For the sake of uniformity and convenience, the Commission
decided to use the Federal Rules of Evidence numbering system.
Similarly, the substance of the 7ederal Rules was to be followed
whenever possible to provide uniformity between federal and state
procedures. However, the Commission adopted the policy that the
substance of the Montana Rules would retain the Montana law of
evidence when balanced against the Federal Rule; there would be
no change for change's sake. Therefore, the Montana Rules were to
lean toward the Federal Rules yet retain desirable Montana law.
1. - Mont. -, 34 St. Rep. 302A (1976).
2. The Montana Rules of Evidence pamphlet published by the State Bar of Montana
contains the petition of the Montana Bar Association for the creation of the Commission and
the order creating the Commission, pp. I and III respectively.
[Vol. 39
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During the time the Commission was drafting the Rules, Congress
reviewed and changed the Federal Rules of Evidence, in most in-
stances changing away from reform and toward the common law.
Other states were adopting rules based on the Federal Rules and the
Uniform Rules of Evidence, based on the Federal Rules, were being
circulated in draft form. This meant that the Commission had plau-
sible alternatives other than existing Montana law and the Federal
Rules to choose from when drafting rules. In the final analysis the
Commission chose rules which it felt best served reform within ex-
isting Montana law and complied with the Federal Rules whenever
possible. It is interesting to note that the federal drafters also relied
upon several previous codifications. Among these was the California
Evidence Code of 1965 which was a combination and reworking of
the Uniform Rules of Evidence of 1953 and the California version
of the Field Code provisions on evidence. Since Montana's then
existing evidence code was almost identical to the former California
Code, the similarities between the coverage of existing Montana
provisions and the Federal Rules were striking. Thus, the majority
of the Rules continue to cover the same areas as the previous evi-
dence code, although certainly changes were made within those
areas.
The Commission also determined that each rule should be ac-
companied by a comment which compared the Montana rule with
the Federal rule, gave a brief statement of the Commission's reasons
for adopting it, and analyzed the rule's effect on existing Montana
law. A more complete explanation of the rules was left to the Federal
Rules' Advisory Committee's Notes which were to complement the
Commission Comments.
Although this article is not intended as a comparison of the
Rules with existing Montana law, it does contain reference to both
the Montana Commission Comments and Federal Advisory Com-
mittee's Notes as well as various commentators' thoughts on the
areas of the law covered. It is the author's hope that the practitioner
can gain a better view of the Rules and how to practice under them.
II. ARTICLE I GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Title, Scope, and Purpose of the Rules
The Montana Rules begin with two rules which are quite differ-
ent in organization from the Federal Rules. Montana Rules 100 and
101 give the title and scope of the rules, while this is accomplished
in a separate article, Article XI, in the Federal Rules. The Commis-
sion considered it to be much simpler and clearer to include Mon-
tana's provisions at the beginning of the rules, particularly because
the scope provisions are less complex than their Federal counter-
part.
19781
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Rule 100 states that the Rules shall be known and cited as the
Montana Rules of Evidence. While there is no official abbreviation,
some commentators and Federal courts are referring to the Federal
Rules as "FRE" so it is logical to assume that the Montana Rules
could be referred to as "MRE."
Rule 101 states the scope of the rules in three subdivisions: the
first two indicate where the Rules do apply, the third where they do
not. Subdivision (a) indicates the Rules apply in all proceedings in
all courts in the state of Montana. This means that the rules apply
in both civil and criminal cases: where the peculiar nature of each
type of case demands separate treatment, that treatment is given.
This subdivision also means that the Rules apply in lower courts,
and even in the supreme court, in the event of an evidentiary hear-
ing before that tribunal. The Rules apply only in courts for two
reasons: first, the constitutional authority of the supreme court to
promulgate these rules extends only to courts;3 and second, the
Commission did not draft the Rules to specifically apply in adminis-
trative hearings, as this is a matter of administrative law.' Subdivi-
sion (b) indicates that the rules of privilege found in Article V,
which incorporates all statutory privileges by reference, apply in all
stages of all actions and proceedings. This resolves problems which
could occur under the next subdivision, involving suspension of the
Rules, because the substance of a privileged communication is never
to be divulged.5
Subdivision (c) enumerates five situations in which the Rules
are inapplicable: under Rule 104(a), grand jury proceedings, miscel-
laneous criminal proceedings, summary proceedings, and miscella-
neous civil proceedings. Discussion of the first situation under Rule
104(a) will be found with that Rule. The second situation, suspen-
sion of the Rules in grand jury proceedings, is also found in the
Federal Rules and is based upon two separate factors. First, it is
impractical to require the Rules of Evidence to apply in such a
proceeding because there is usually no opposing counsel to object or
judge to rule objections and lay jurors conduct the inquiries. Sec-
ond, the United States Supreme Court rejects the proposition that
3. MONT. CONST. art. VII, § 2(3) provides that the Supreme Court of Montana has
authority to establish rules and procedure for all courts of the state.
4. REVISED CODES OF MONTANA (1947) [hereinafter cited as R.C.M. 1947], § 82-4210(1)
(Supp. 1977) provides in pertinent part that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by statute
directly relating to an agency, agencies shall be bound by common law and statutory rules of
evidence." One such exception is found in R.C.M. 1947, § 92-852(1) (Supp. 1977), which
provides that the Workers' Compensation Court is not bound by rules of evidence.
5. See Commission Comment to this subdivision indicating that R.C.M. 1947, § 93-701-
4 could be construed to state this proposition.
[Vol. 39
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indictments must be based on legal evidence,' nor apparently does
Montana law require evidence in grand jury proceedings to be le-
gally admissible.7 The third instance in which the Rules do not
apply is in miscellaneous criminal proceedings and youth court ac-
tions. The paragraph is a composite of the equivalent Federal Rule
and of other situations in which the Commission felt that applica-
tion of the Rules is unnecessary. In all the proceedings listed the
judge acts without a jury, and his determinations do not relate to
guilt or innocence. The Commission Comment, however, indicates
that substantive due process is not to be abrogated by the suspen-
sion of the Rules: the court may apply the Rules in these proceed-
ings when it considers them necessary.' Other reasons for not apply-
ing the Rules in these situations relate to two considerations: first,
determinations of probable cause do not have to be based on admis-
sible evidence;' and second, where the proceeding is ex parte in
nature, there is no likelihood of objections being raised and no need
to apply the Rules. The fourth instance in which the Rules do not
apply is where the court acts summarily, such as in contempt pro-
ceedings. Whenever the court is authorized by statute to act sum-
marily, .it may conduct proceedings without regard to the Rules
because as a practical matter the Rules need not be applied. This
paragraph does not apply to summary judgments under Rule 56 of
the Montana Rules of Civil Procedure. Finally, the Rules do not
apply in miscellaneous civil proceedings which are ex parte or un-
contested in nature. Again, where there will be no objecting party,
there is no need for the Rules to apply.
The purpose and construction of the Rules is set out in Rule
102, which is identical to the Federal and Uniform (1974) Rules.
This provision is similar to provisions in other sets of rules, 0 and is
designed to prevent technical rulings on evidentiary matters which
result in injustice. The theme of the Rules, therefore, is to "admit
evidence unless some good reason exists to exclude it."' ,
6. Costello v. United States, 350 U.S. 359, 363 (1963). See Advisory Committee's Note
to FED. R. EviD. 1101(d)(2), 56 F.R.D. 183, 351 (1972) (citing Costello and 1 WIGMORE ON
EVIDENCE § 4 (5) (3d ed. 1940). See also United States v. Callandra, 414 U.S. 338, 343-50
(1974).
7. R.C.M. 1947, § 95-1408(1) (Supp. 1977) provides that:
In the investigation of a charge, the grand jury shall receive no other evidence
than that given by witnesses produced and sworn before it or furnished by legal
documentary evidence or the deposition of a witness in the cases mentioned in 95-
1802.
8. Commission Comment to Montana Rules of Evidence [hereinafter cited as Mont.
R. Evid.] 101(c).
9. State v. Miner, 169 Mont. 260, 264, 546 P.2d 252, 254-55 (1976).
10. See, for example, FED. R. CRIM. P. 2; R.C.M. 1947, § 93-2801-1.
11. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 102.
19781
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B. Rulings on Evidence
As a practical matter, Rule 103, Rulings on Evidence, will be
the most used of any of the Rules of Evidence because no other rules
will ever be applied unless there is a request for a ruling from a
party. Rules of evidence are procedural in nature, rather than sub-
stantive, and unless a rule of evidence is asserted in an objection,
motion to strike or offer of proof, any right to have evidence admit-
ted or excluded under that rule is waived."2 Therefore if the practi-
tioner wishes to have a rule of evidence applied, it is extremely
important that he thoroughly understand Rule 103.
This Rule is drafted in terms of protecting the rights of parties
in the event a ruling is challenged in a later proceeding or appeal.
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 103(a) sets out the
general requirements and reasons for this rule:
Rulings on evidence cannot be assigned as error unless (1) a sub-
stantial right is affected, and (2) the nature of the error was called
to the attention of the judge, so as to alert him to the proper course
of action and enable opposing counsel to take proper corrective
measures. The objection and offer of proof are the techniques for
accomplishing these objectives. 3
As the Commission Comment to this Rule indicates, these princi-
ples are consistent with Montana law and practice.
It is apparent, then, that before error may be predicated upon
a ruling admitting or excluding evidence, the ruling must first affect
a substantial right of the objecting party. There will be no reversal
of a ruling if the error is technical only or if it results in harmless
error. In fact, this is the long-standing "harmless error" provision
of the rules of evidence and there is no intent to change that provi-
sion with Rule 103. 4
When the Federal Rules were circulated for comment, some
observers criticized Rule 103 for not defining the terms "substantial
rights" and "affected."' 5 They questioned whether there is a distinc-
tion between an error which could affect substantial rights and a
harmless error. For example, a violation of substantial rights, such
as illegal wiretap evidence, could be introduced and have no effect
on the outcome and so be a harmless error." It is notable that
12. Ladd, Objections, Motions, and Foundation Testimony, 43 CORNELL L.Q. 543, 544
(1958).
13. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 103(a), 56 F.R.D. 183, 195 (1972).
14. Id.
15. FARAGE, CRITIQUE OF THE PROPOSED FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE, ABA SEC. INS. NEG.
& COMp. L. PROC. 433 (1970).
16. Schwartz, The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence: An Introduction and Critique,
38 U, CIN. L. REV. 449, 453 (1969).
[Vol. 39
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previous codifications 7 used a test of whether the admission or ex-
clusion of the evidence affected the outcome of the trial, not whether
a substantial right is affected. Perhaps this criticism is misplaced.
A close reading of Rule 103 indicates that an error is harmless unless
it affects substantial rights, not that an error is prejudicial if it
affects substantial rights without more.'" In any event, the phrase
"affects substantial rights" is currently used in at least four provi-
sions 9 concerned with predication of error on appeal and should
constitute no problem in Montana.
The Advisory Committee's Note to this Rule 0 also implies that
it does not affect the doctrine of harmless error in the sense of
violation of constitutional rights. Therefore, it is intended that the
use of the term "substantial rights" states the law generally ac-
cepted today.
The second requirement to be met before error may be predi-
cated upon a ruling is that the nature of the error was called to the
attention of the judge. This is accomplished by three means, corre-
sponding to two different situations: rulings admitting evidence and
rulings excluding evidence. The proper means of pointing out error
for rulings admitting evidence is an objection, accompanied, if nec-
essary, by a motion to strike. The proper means of pointing out error
to rulings excluding evidence is an offer of proof.
A proper objection or motion to strike must be timely and spe-
cific. The timeliness requirement applies so that the objecting party
makes known the objection as soon as the applicability of the rule
is known.2 ' As previously noted, both the judge and counsel should
be made aware of the error when it occurs so that meaningful correc-
tive action may be taken. Further, a party should not be allowed to
gamble that an answer containing inadmissible evidence could be
favorable, but, if unfavorable, be allowed to later object to the an-
swer. 22 If there are instances in which an objection cannot be inter-
posed between question and answer, for example, with a forward
witness or where the grounds for the objection are not apparent, the
remedy is a motion to strike.23 The requirement that the objection
17. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rules 6 and 7 (1942); UNIFORM RULES OF EVIDENCE 4 and
5.
18. Rothstein, PRACTICE COMMENTS TO RULES OF EVIDENCE FOR U.S. COURTS AND
MAGISTRATES 14 (1973).
19. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-5603 (grounds for new trial); MONT. R. Civ. P. 61 (harmless
error); MONT. R. App. Civ. P. 14 (review of rulings on appeal); and R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2425
(appeals in criminal cases).
20. 56 F.R.D. 183, 195 (1972).
21. 1 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 18 at 323 (3d ed. 1940).
22. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 133 (2d ed. 1972). See also Yoder
v. Reynolds, 28 Mont. 183, 194, 72 P. 416, 419 (1903).
23. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 113.
1978]
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be specific also allows corrective action. The objecting party must
make known to the court and opposing counsel the grounds or rule
upon which the evidence should be excluded so that opposing coun-
sel may elicit admissible evidence to prove that part of his case.
Further, this requirement looks toward appellate review. If the
judge overrules a timely objection made upon the wrong grounds
and so admits the evidence, he has properly ruled. The party has
not expressed the proper reason for excluding the evidence 4 and has
waived objection on other grounds.25 This requirement nullifies the
"general" objection which does not state the specific ground of ex-
clusion. For example, the objection that evidence is "incompetent"
is insufficient." Although this Rule does not require the specific
grounds to be stated if they are apparent from the context, the
better practice is to state the grounds.
Rulings excluding evidence must be handled in a different
manner, through an offer of proof, so that the substance of evidence
is made known and put in the record. The party conducting the
examination must make an offer of proof only after the exclusion of
offered evidence. The purpose of the offer of proof is to point out to
the judge that an error has been made and to allow corrective action.
Although it is reasonable to assume that a trial judge could reverse
his ruling after hearing the substance of the evidence in the offer of
proof,2 the Supreme Court of Montana stated the principal reason
for an offer of proof in terms of appellate review: "It is impossible
for this court to say whether certain evidence was improperly ex-
cluded, unless the record discloses the offered evidence. ' 28 Again, an
exception to the offer of proof requirement exists in the Rule if the
substance of the answer is apparent from the context, but the better
practice is to state the substance of the answer to avoid confusion.
Subdivisions (b) and (c) of Rule 103 go on to detail the process
of making offers of proof that is found in Rule 43 (c), Montana Rules
of Civil Procedure. These subdivisions allow the trial court to add
any statement in the record to clarify the situation or require the
offer to be made in question and answer form, and allow the trial
court to ensure that inadmissible evidence is not suggested to the
jury through an offer of proof.
The final subdivision of Rule 103 deals with plain error, a topic
which is probably new to Montana law. As a general rule, the su-
24. Ladd, supra note 11, at 544.
25. Baker v. Union Assurance Soc'y of London, 81 Mont. 281, 299, 264 P. 132, 138
(1928).
26. City of Helena v. Albertose, 8 Mont. 499, 504, 20 P. 817, 818 (1889).
27. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 110.
28. Milwaukee Gold Extraction Co. v. Gordon, 37 Mont. 209, 223, 95 P. 995, 1000
(1908).
[Vol. 39
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preme court will consider only questions raised during trial through
objection, motion to strike or offer of proof."9 As indicated in the
Commission Comment to this subdivision, there are exceptions to
this practice which permit certain issues to be raised on appeal for
the first time. These include constitutional questions,30 jurisdic-
tional questions," and the issue of whether the complaint supports
the judgment.32 The Commission concluded that it is proper to ex-
tend the same considerations to rulings on evidence which affect the
substantial rights of the parties. The application of the plain error
rule, however, remains discretionary with the court, and is not a
matter of right, even when requested by a party. The fact that only
the court has the power to invoke this rule is enough to indicate that
the better practice is to make proper objections and offers of proof
rather than to rely on this subdivision.
C. Preliminary Questions of Admissibility
Rule 104 addresses the question of whether the judge or jury will
determine preliminary questions of fact in admitting evidence,
qualifying persons to be witnesses, and determining the existence of
a privilege. The first subdivision provides that the judge shall decide
these matters while the determination of ultimate fact is left with
the jury. An example of such a preliminary question involves the
determination of the existence of a marital privilege. The judge first
answers the question of whether a valid marriage exists, and if so,
whether a valid husband-wife privilege may be claimed. In most
instances the judge is in a much better position to make these deter-
minations than the jury. The determination of the admissibility of
a confession is a clear example of the judge's superior position.
Certainly it would be difficult for jurors to determine that a confes-
sion was not made voluntarily and then exclude its existence from
their minds when making the ultimate determination of guilt or
innocence. 33 Under Rule 101(c)(1) the rules of evidence do not apply
to these preliminary determinations. In the foregoing example, it
would be helpful for the judge to view the contents of the confession
before making a determination of voluntariness. Yet the rules of
29. Spencer v. Robertson, 151 Mont. 507, 511, 455 P.2d 48, 50-51 (1968); See also MONT.
R. App. Civ. P. 2 and 3.
30. In re Clark's Estate, 105 Mont. 401, 409, 74 P.2d 401, 406 (1937).
31. Labbit v. Bunston, 80 Mont. 293, 303, 260 P. 727, 731 (1927); See also MONT. R.
App. Civ. P. 12(h)(2).
32. Crenshaw v. Crenshaw, 120 Mont. 190, 201, 182 P.2d 477, 483 (1947); Tracy v.
Harmon, 17 Mont. 465, 468, 43 P. 500, 501 (1896); see also Halldorson v. Halldorson,
Mont. ., -, 573 P.2d 169, 171-72 (1977).
33. Maguire & Epstein, Preliminary Questions of Fact in Determining the Admissibil-
ity of Evidence, 40 HARV. L. REV. 392, 393 (1929).
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evidence, if applied, would not permit such viewing. In any event,
Rule 104(a) makes clear that while not bound by rules of evidence,
the judge is bound by the rules with respect to privilege in making
the determination of the existence of a privilege. Therefore, the
substance of the privileged communication will always be protected.
Another problem arises in this area when the determination of
a preliminary question coincides with an ultimate question of fact,
that is, when the determination of the preliminary question has the
effect of deciding the ultimate question. For example, when a plain-
tiff sues on a lost instrument, the preliminary determination of the
admissibility of secondary evidence will have the effect of determin-
ing the outcome, for if the judge rules the secondary evidence inad-
missible, plaintiff has failed to prove his case.34 No Montana case
addresses such a problem, so it appears that the usual rule will be
followed. The judge will make the determination without regard to
its effect on the outcome.
Rule 104(b) differs from its federal counterpart. The Federal
Rule permits the jury to make determinations of relevancy of evi-
dence when that determination is dependent upon the existence of
a preliminary fact. The originator of the "conditional relevance"
theory, Professor Edmund Morgan, believed that while there are
instances when the jury must be protected from inadmissible evi-
dence, the determination of relevancy conditioned on the existence
of another preliminary fact was much like determinations of ulti-
mate facts. That is, in the determination of ultimate facts the jury
must decide whether to believe or disbelieve that certain facts ex-
isted. The same process occurs in making the determination of rele-
vancy of a fact because the jury must believe or disbelieve that
certain preliminary facts exist to determine relevance.3" Another
reason in favor of the Federal Rule is that in not allowing the jury
to make determinations of this sort the jury would be greatly re-
stricted in its function as trier of fact.3
6
Despite the Rule's theoretical soundness, the Commission con-
sidered it impractical when applied to different situations: this is
crucial because such questions are for the jury, not the judge. Exam-
ples given by Morgan37 differ entirely from those given by the Advi-
sory Committee's Note to the Federal Rule, 38 thus no clear definition
of "conditional relevance" exists. The Commission chose to substi-
tute the standard "connecting-up" rule long recognized in Montana
34. McCoRMICK, supra note 22, at 124.
35. MORGAN, BASIC PROBLEMS IN EVIDENCE 45 (1962).
36. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 104(b), 56 F.R.D. 183, 198 (1972).
37. MORGAN, supra note 35, at 45.
38. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 104(b), 56 F.R.D. 183, 198 (1972).
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which allows a party to admit evidence subject to the condition that
its admissibility be shown by a subsequent witness. The rule is
necessary because of the impossibility of simultaneous presentation
of all witnesses to obtain a chronologically correct presentation of
the facts in a case. The only real difficulty with the connecting-up
rule is the problem arising when the evidence is not connected-up.
The only solution is to strike the non-connected-up evidence. Mon-
tana, following the majority rule, requires opposing counsel to object
and move to strike.39 This becomes a critical problem in cases where
potentially prejudicial evidence is admitted without being
connected-up, because attempts to erase the evidence from the ju-
rors' minds with motions to strike and instructions to disregard are
probably futile.
The third subdivision of Rule 104(c) makes it clear that hear-
ings on the admissibility of confessions are to be conducted out of
the presence of the jury; that when the accused is a witness, confes-
sions should be out of the presence of the jury when he so requests;
and that the jury may be excluded for other preliminary matters,
as the interests of justice require.
Subdivision (d) of Rule 104 is a special provision for criminal
cases allowing and encouraging the accused to testify on preliminary
matters without subjecting himself to cross-examination as to other
matters in the case. This subdivision is not intended to change the
rule in Montana allowing complete cross-examination of an accused
who takes the stand during trial and denies that he committed the
crime for which he is on trial.'"
Part (e), the final subdivison of Rule 104, is intended to guaran-
tee the parties the right to introduce evidence and argue its weight
and credibility, a right which could be viewed as circumscribed by
subdivision (a) limiting determinations of preliminary 4uestions to
the court. To illustrate, evidence may be admitted which has the
effect of challenging the competence of a witness. This should be
allowed to go to weight and credibility of his testimony under subdi-
vision (e), even though the court has already made a determination
of competence under subdivision (a).
D. Limited Admissibility
Rule 105 provides that evidence may be admitted for a special
purpose even though it is inadmissible for another or general pur-
pose. This is accomplished by allowing evidence to be limited to the
39. Pfau v. Stokke, 110 Mont. 471, 474, 103 P.2d 673, 674 (1940); State v. Simanton,
100 Mont. 292, 309, 49 P.2d 981, 985 (1935).
40. State v. Rogers, 31 Mont. 1, 7, 77 P. 293, 295 (1904).
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special purpose through an instruction to the jury. This rule is rec-
ognized in Montana" and has been applied in several cases. In one
instance the court permitted evidence of prior fires on the defen-
dant's right of way, not for the purpose of showing negligent con-
duct, but to show that the defendant had permitted combustible
material to accumulate.42 In another, the court held certain hearsay
testimony admissible, not as proof of the facts, but to show what
information was available to draft pleadings and as a chain of ex-
planatory circumstances. 3 In another, the court admitted evidence
against both principal and surety, indicating that if the surety had
wished the evidence limited to use against the principal, it should
have asked for a limiting instruction, because failure to do so waived
the right to claim error." In connection with this, it has been held
that counsel has the duty to separate the admissible from inadmissi-
ble evidence. He must request the evidence to be admitted for a
special purpose, for when a court is faced with an objection it is not
its duty to separate admissible from inadmissible evidence. 5 In an-
other case the court held parole evidence admissible, not to change
or vary the terms of the deed, but to show consideration for the
terms." Yet another case held exhibits admissible, not for the pur-
pose of proving the wealth of defendants, but to establish their
identity as officers of a corporation. 7 Finally, the court has held a
photograph admissible, not for the purpose of showing subsequent
remedial measures, but to show the scene of the accident.48
The Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 10541 indicates
one of the major problems with this rule is its introduction of poten-
tially prejudicial evidence and the ineffectiveness of a limiting in-
struction. It points out the problem is particularly critical with
criminal cases, citing Bruton v. United States,0 which held that a
limiting instruction was inadequate where a codefendant's confes-
sion inculpating Bruton was admitted with such an instruction. The
practitioner must be aware of this problem with Rule 105.
41. Outlook Farmers' Elevator Co. v. American Sur. Co., 70 Mont. 8, 25, 223 P. 905,
911 (1924).
42. Pure Oil Co. v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 56 Mont. 266, 275, 185 P. 150,
152 (1919).
43. Hester v. Western Life & Accident Ins. Co., 67 Mont. 286, 290, 215 P. 508, 509
(1923).
44. Outlook Farmers' Elevator Co. v. American Sur. Co., 70 Mont. 8, 25, 223 P. 905,
911 (1924).
45. Farleigh v. Kelly, 28 Mont. 421, 433, 72 P. 756, 760 (1903).
46. DeAtley v. Streit, 81 Mont. 382, 390, 263 P. 967, 971 (1928).
47. Edquest v. Tripp & Dragstedt Co., 93 Mont. 446, 454, 19 P.2d 637, 639 (1933).
48. Teesdale v. Anschutz Drilling Co., 138 Mont. 427, 439, 357 P.2d 4, 11 (1970).
49. 56 F.R.D. 183, 200 (1972). (This citation is to the original Rule 106 which later was
renumbered Rule 105).
50. 389 U.S. 818 (1968).
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E. Completeness Rule
Rule 106, Remainder of or Related Acts, Writings, or State-
ments, is the completeness rule. It is based on two considerations:
that a misleading impression can be created when matters are pre-
sented out of context; and that attempts to explain or repair the
damage done by the out-of-context impression are usually inade-
quate.' In order to remedy the situation the Rule combines the
Federal Rule with Montana law5" to admit into evidence an entire
act, writing or recorded statement, or series thereof, when parts of
such items create an unfair impression. In addition to requiring
immediate introduction at the request of a party, the Rule allows
the adverse party to inquire into or introduce any other part of such
items, and cross-examine or further develop matters covered by the
Rule. Under case law, the matters admitted to make a complete
impression need not be independently admissible.53
III. ARTICLES II AND III JUDICIAL NOTICE AND PRESUMPTIONS
Articles II and III provide convenient means of placing facts or
law in evidence without formal proof. Article II, Judicial Notice,
provides parties and the court with a tool for establishing facts
which neither side nor an objective observer would contend are sus-
ceptible of being false. Because there would be no contest as to the
existence of these types of facts, it is of tremendous time-saving
value to allow the court to recognize and establish such facts as
proven. The same can be said for laws, and Article II also provides
an expansion in the judicial notice of law. Article III, Presumptions,
is concerned with the procedural aspect of presumptions, or their
effect, and not with any of the particular existing presumptions.
Presumptions provide a short-cut to the normal process of proof of
facts by providing that once certain basic facts are proved a pre-
sumption of fact occurs and the matter is established, unless there
is a contest as to either the basic or presumed facts. Again, lessening
the steps required to prove facts is a time-saving and convenient
tool.
A. Judicial Notice of Facts
Rule 201(a) rejects the Federal classification of "adjudicative"
and (by implication) "legislative" facts which categorize the types
51. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EviD. 106, 56 F.R.D. 183, 201 (1972). (This
citation is to the original Rule 107 which later was renumbered Rule 106).
52. Commission Comment to MONT. R. Evm. 106.
53. Hulse v. Northern Pac. Ry., 47 Mont. 59, 63 130 P. 415, 416 (1913); McConnell v.
Combination Mining & Milling Co., 30 Mont. 263, 293, 76 P. 194, 202 (1904).
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of facts that may be judicially noticed by simply providing that all
facts may be judicially noticed, leaving further refinement to subdi-
vision (b). The notion of "adjudicative" and "legislative" facts has
been advanced by Professor Kenneth C. Davis 4 for decades in an
attempt to analyze the types of facts allowed to be judicially noticed
in appellate court decisions. Broadly speaking, adjudicative facts
are those which must be proven in ordinary litigation, or "the facts
of the particular case."5" "Legislative" facts are "those which have
relevance to legal reasoning and the lawmaking process, whether in
the formulation of a legal principle or ruling by a judge or court or
in the enactment of a legislative body."56
One problem with this analysis is deciding whether a fact
should be included within the "adjudicative" category and so be
governed by Rule 201, or considered a "legislative" fact and not
governed by the Rules of Evidence at all. The Commission felt that
adopting the Federal Rule would lead to needless litigation concern-
ing a rule which should simplify the judicial notice process and not
encumber it. This feeling is verified by the fact that nineteen federal
decisions have dealt with Federal Rule 201 since it was enacted. 7
Further, the Federal Advisory Committee has been criticized by the
originator of the terms, Professor Davis, because it
assumes that all facts either (a) pertain to the parties or (b) are
used for law making. But the facts of life are more complex. Some
facts that do not pertain to the parties are used for purposes other
than law making.58
The Commission agreed with this analysis, not only as a criticism
of the Federal Rule, but also as a reason for not using Professor
Davis' analysis. Therefore, as the Commission Comment to Mon-
tana Rule 201 states:
The Commission rejects the approach under the Federal Rule 201
of limiting judicial notice to adjudicative facts because this is a
basis which is totally new, not clearly defined, and contrary to
existing Montana practice. The confusion and litigation bound to
result are clearly contrary to a rule which is meant to save time
and expense.
54. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 150.3 (1959); Davis, Judicial Notice, 1969 LAW
& Soc. ORD. 513; Davis, "A System of Judicial Notice Based on Fairness and Convenience,"
PERSPECTIVES OF LAW 69 (Pound, ed. 1964); Davis, Judicial Notice, 55 COL. L. REv. 945 (1955);
Davis, Official Notice, 62 HARV. L. REV. 537 (1949); Davis, An Approach to the Problem of
Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55 HARV. L. REV. 364 (1942).
55. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvuD. 201, 56 F.R.D. 183, 202 (1972).
56. Id.
57. FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE NEWS, Cumulative Table of Cases, Vol. 1, 76-1, Vol. 2,
77-1 (Schmertz, ed. 1976, 1977).
58. Davis, Judicial Notice, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORD. 513, 525 n. 43.
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Subdivision (b) of Rule 201 represents a change in Montana's
approach for taking judicial notice of facts because it sets out two
broad categories rather than attempting to list specific facts which
may be judicially noticed. 9 The first category is concerned with
facts "generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of the trial
court" and repeats in different terms the case law approach allowing
judicial notice of facts of "common knowledge." 6 It is important to
note that this category is not intended to include facts personally
known to the trial judge."' The second category is concerned with
facts "capable of accurate and ready determination by resort to
sources whose accuracy cannot be reasonably questioned" and is
intended to allow standard reference books, reports, and the like to
be judicially noticed. This is also consistent with existing Montana
law."2
As the Commission Comment to Rule 201(b) indicates, if a fact
is one that is subject to a reasonable dispute, judicial notice is not
the proper method of entering that fact in evidence, for it should be
proven like any other disputed fact through testimony, documen-
tary evidence or other means. It is important to remember that
judicial notice is intended to save time and expense by not requiring
formal proof for only indisputable facts.
Subdivisions (c) through (g) of Rule 201 are concerned with
procedural aspects of judicial notice. A court is allowed discretion
to take judicial notice whether requested or not, but must take
judicial notice if requested by the party and supplied with the nec-
essary information. Parties may contest the taking of judicial notice
of particular facts in that they are not within the standards of subdi-
vision (b). Judicial notice may be taken at any stage of any proceed-
ing, from pretrial conference through appellate determination. Fi-
nally, in civil cases the jury is to be instructed to accept as conclu-
sive facts which are judicially noticed, but in criminal cases the jury
is to be instructed that it may but is not required to accept such
facts as conclusive in order to safeguard the accused's right to trial
by jury.
B. Judicial Notice of Law
Rule 202 is concerned with judicial notice of law. It is an origi-
nal provision which parallels Rule 201. The Advisory Committee's
59. See R.C.M. 1947, § 93-501-1 for such a list.
60. See, e.g., Clark v. Worral, 146 Mont. 374, 380, 406 P.2d 822, 825 (1965); State ex
rel. Schultz-Lindsey v. Board of Equalization, 145 Mont. 380, 401, 403 P.2d 635, 646 (1965).
61. See Holtz v. Babcock, 143 Mont. 341, 389 P.2d 869, rehearing denied 143 Mont. at
373, 390 P.2d 801, 802-03 (1964).
62. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-501-1(8) and 93-1101-8.
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Note to Federal Rule 2013 concludes that judicial notice of law is a
matter for rules of procedure, not rules of evidence. The Commission
felt that existing Montana law was in need of reform, that proof of
law can be seen as a proper subject of rules of evidence, and there-
fore, that it should draft this Rule to codify, clarify and reform the
law on judicial notice of law. This Rule is intended to be consistent
with and complementary to Rule 9 (d), Montana Rules of Civil
Procedure, requiring ordinances and statutes to be pleaded as spe-
cial matters.64
Rule 202(a) indicates that the Rule governs judicial notice of
law, which must be distinguished from judicial notice of fact under
Rule 201. Rule 202(b) presents a list of the kinds of law allowed to
be judicially noticed, but it is not an exclusive list, for the rule
begins: "Law includes but is not limited to the following ... .
Much of the list incorporates existing Montana statutes and cases
on judicial notice of law, but makes changes in several areas of case
law. For example, courts are now allowed to take judicial notice of
ordinances of city or municipal governments. The Commission felt
this a sensible and convenient change, particularly because the
party using the ordinance is required to plead it as a special matter
under Rule 9(d), Montana Rules of Civil Procedure, and ordinances
are readily available. There is an expansion to permit judicial notice
of records of courts of record from other jurisdictions. Courts, in-
cluding the supreme court, may now take judicial notice of local
court rules because the supreme court is now promulgating rules of
court and local court rules are available in any county courthouse.
These areas represent a change in Montana law in that cases have
held it improper to take judicial notice of such law. 5 Two new areas
included in the list allow judicial notice of international law and
maritime law. The Commission concluded that the list is suffi-
ciently inclusive to allow a court to take judicial notice of any law.
Again since the list is not exclusive, room for development is pres-
ent.
The last five subdivisions of the Rule closely parallel Rule 201
and incorporate the Uniform Judicial Notice of Foreign Law Act
procedural sections 6 to ensure that all parties are aware of and
hopefully in agreement with a court's taking judicial notice of law.
No change from existing Montana law is intended by these provi-
sions. Among them are provisions allowing the court to take judicial
notice of any of the law listed in subdivision (b) except the first
63. 56 F.R.D. 183, 207 (1972).
64. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 202(a).
65. State ex rel. Coleman v. District Court, 120 Mont. 372, 377, 186 P.2d 91, 94 (1947).
66. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-501-2 to 501-8.
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clause which is mandatory, allowing the court to inform itself of any
law in such manner as it deems proper and to call upon counsel for
aid, allowing the parties to require the court to take judicial notice
of law when the party requests it and supplies the necessary infor-
mation, and a provision allowing the parties an opportunity to be
heard on the propriety of the court's taking judicial notice of any
particular law. The Rule also provides that judicial notice of law
may take place at any stage of the proceedings and if a party pres-
ents evidence of a law of another jurisdiction in order that it be
introduced or judicially noticed, it must give reasonable notice of its
intention to do so. Finally, the Rule provides that the determination
of law shall be made by the court, except as otherwise provided,
referring to the Montana constitutional provision on libel.6 7
C. Presumptions
Article III, Presumptions, contains two rules, one on presump-
tions in general and the other or the applicability of federal pre-
sumptions in state cases. It does not contain any presumptions it-
self, but instead indicates how they are to operate. 8
Rule 301(a) defines presumptions. The Federal Rule does not
contain such a definition because of the Advisory Committee's view
that presumptions must operate differently in criminal cases than
in other contexts. 9 Whether or not this is a valid reason for not
including a definition, it appears that many commentators felt
there was a definite need for some clarification. As one text warns:
''presumption is the slipperiest member of the family of legal
terms."70 It is apparent that the matter is left to general law,7 but
this does not answer such questions as whether the rule applies to
inferences" or conclusive presumptions, or whether previously of-
fered definitions from the Model Code (1942) or Uniform Rules
(1954) may be used.7 The Commission determined that it is better
to define presumptions as well as to state their effect in order to
clarify basic terms and keep all the law of evidence in one place
whenever possible.
67. MONT. CONST. art. II, § 7 provides that in libel and slander actions the court shall
aid the jury in determining the law and facts.
68. MONT. R. EVID. Table D lists nearly all the presumptions existing under Montana
law.
69. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 303 (not enacted), 56 F.R.D. 183, 213
(1972).
70. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 802.
71. ROTHSTEIN, UNDERSTANDING THE NEW FEDERAL RuLEs OF EVIDENCE 14 (1973).
72. Id.
73. Comment, Presumptions Under the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 WAYNE
L. REV. 135, 154 (1969).
74. Farnoff, Presumptions: The Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 24 ARK. L. REV.
401, 403 (1971).
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Montana Rule 301(a) defines a presumption as "an assumption
of fact that the law requires to be made from another fact or group
of facts found or otherwise established in the action or proceeding."
The definition thus indicates that presumptions differ from infer-
ences in that they must be made, while inferences are logical
thought processes which may be made. It also points out that a
presumption is an assumption, rather than a deduction, so that
presumptions based on public policy as well as logic are included
within the definition. 75
The basic elements of a presumption are its basic fact and its
presumed fact.7 A basic fact is "the fact or group of facts giving rise
to a presumption. ' 77 A presumed fact is the "assumption of fact"
found in the definition in Rule 301(a). An example is helpful in
understanding these terms. In the presumption "[t]hat a letter
duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the
mail, 78 the basic facts are that the letter was duly directed and
mailed, for these facts give rise to the presumption. Here the pre-
sumed fact or presumption is that the letter was received. A clear
understanding of these terms is important when considering the
classification and effect of presumptions covered in Rule 301(b).
That subdivision classifies two different kinds of presumptions,
conclusive and disputable. A conclusive presumption is a presump-
tion in which the presumed fact may not be controverted, that is,
either challenged or disproven by contrary evidence. The basic fact
of a conclusive presumption, or the facts giving rise to it, may be
challenged so that the conclusive presumption does not arise. A
disputable presumption is simply a presumption in which either the
basic or presumed facts may be controverted.
Rule 301(b), as well as the Federal and Uniform Rules 301, also
states the effect of presumptions. In order to fully understand each
of these rules, it is necessary to examine the three major theories of
presumptions, each of which is followed by the three different Rules.
Under each theory the basic facts giving rise to the presumption
must be introduced and accepted as established. If evidence is intro-
duced challenging the existence of a basic fact, a question is pre-
sented concerning whether a presumption exists at all, and not what
effect it has. Under the definition provided in Rule 301(a) and all
three theories, if the basic facts appear and there is no evidence
75. For a more complete discussion of this definition see Commission Comment to
MONT. R. EVID. 301(a) and Clarke, Statutory and Common Law Presumptions in Montana,
37 MONT. L. REV. 91, 92 (1976).
76. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 701 (1942).
77. Id.
78. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1301-7(24).
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introduced contrary to the presumed fact that the letter was re-
ceived, the trier of fact must accept the presumed fact because this
is the "assumption of fact the law requires to be made." It is reason-
able to suggest that if the basic facts do not exist, the jury should
be told to disregard the presumed facts. If there is a question as to
the existence of the basic facts, the jury should probably be in-
structed that if it finds the basic facts it must find in favor of the
presumption.79 In the following discussion, it must be assumed that
the basic facts have been established.
The theories differ when evidence is presented contrary to the
presumed fact. It is apparent that the effect of presumptions is
related to the burden of proof. Under the two major theories adopted
by the Federal and Uniform (1974) Rules, the shifting of the two
burdens of proof is the sole effect of presumptions. Under Federal
Rule 301, the effect of a presumption is to shift the burden of pro-
ducing evidence contrary to the presumption. Once evidence is in-
troduced contrary to the presumption, it disappears. Accordingly,
this theory is known as the "bursting bubble" or "disappearing
presumption" theory, advocated by Professors Thayer and Wig-
more.'" From the viewpoint of the party against whom the presump-
tion operates, this theory requires that if the party introduces no
evidence contrary to the presumed fact, the jury will be instructed
to accept it. If the party introduced evidence contrary to the pre-
sumed fact, there will be no presumption, there will be no instruc-
tion, and the jury will weigh the contrary evidence against the basic
facts, which have given rise to a mere inference." It is apparent that
this theory gives the weakest effect to presumptions. 2
Under Uniform Rule (1974) 301, the effect of a presumption is
to shift the burden of persuasion, or proving the nonexistence of the
presumed fact, to the party against whom the presumption oper-
ates. From the point of view of the party against whom the presump-
tion operates, this theory requires the party to present a preponder-
ance of evidence contrary to the presumption and the jury to be
instructed to that effect or the presumption will be accepted as
established.
Following Montana case law, 3 Rule 301(b) recognizes the rule
that presumptions have the weight and effect of evidence. Under
79. Judicial Council Committee's Note to Wis. STAT. ANN. § 903.1 (West). The relevant
portion of the Note may also be found in 56 MARQ. L. REv. 155, 193 (1973). The Marquette
Law Review devoted all of its Vol. 56, No. 2 to the then "Proposed Wisconsin Rules of
Evidence."
80. MORGAN, supra note 35, at 34-35.
81. 1 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 300-04 (1975).
82. Assembly Committee on Judiciary Comment to CAL. EvID. CODE § 606 (West).
83. Lewis v. New York Life Ins. Co., 113 Mont. 151, 162, 124 P.2d 579, 583 (1942).
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this rule, the trier of fact is instructed that the presumed fact is to
be weighed as evidence against the contrary evidence to determine
by a preponderance of evidence whether it will believe the existence
of the presumed fact or contrary evidence. An exception to this rule
exists when the evidence contrary to the presumed fact is so over-
whelmingly against it, then as a matter of law the judge can remove
the presumption from the jury's consideration. 84 The difference be-
tween the Uniform (1974) and Montana Rule is that in Montana the
presumption is viewed as evidence rather than an assumption which
can be overcome by contrary evidence. The difference is only slight,
and relates to instruction of the jury. It could perhaps make a differ-
ence in appellate review of the evidence in the case.
The final subdivision of Rule 301, dealing with inconsistent
presumptions, provides a sensible solution to this difficult problem,
in that presumptions of greater policy weight are to be considered
over those with lesser policy but if of equal policy weight, then they
are disregarded.
Rule 302 addresses the unique situation of having a federally
recognized presumption applying in Montana courts. If this occurs,
the presumption must be given the same effect as it is given in
Federal courts. The determination of whether a presumption is a
"federal" presumption is made on the basis of whether a federally
created right is at issue. If a presumption is a substantive element
of the claim or defense, the federal procedural law applies.85 This
means that Federal Rule 301 and the disappearing presumption
theory would apply.
IV. ARTICLE IV RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS
In the scheme of the Rules of Evidence, Article IV is the first
dealing with major rules of evidence, the first three articles being
general provisions and means of introducing evidence other than by
formal proof. This article is also one of the most important because
in determining the admissibility of any evidence, the first question
is always whether the evidence is relevant." Problems of relevancy
are usually concerned with circumstantial evidence, or evidence
from which the fact to be proved must be inferred or presumed,
because there is usually no question that direct testimony of a fact
is relevant, assuming that fact needs to be proven in the action.
Article IV can be divided into two parts. The first consists of
three general rules designed to allow the trial judge flexibility in
84. Nichols v. New York Life Ins. Co., 88 Mont. 132, 139, 292 P. 253, 255 (1930).
85. WRIGHT, THE LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS, § 45 at 174 (2d ed. 1970).
86. THAYER. PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 269 (1898).
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determining relevance and whether evidence, if relevant, should be
excluded because its probative value is outweighed by other consid-
erations. The second contains eight rules which determine whether
certain evidence should be admissible and have not left admissibil-
ity to the discretion of the trial judge. These latter rules are based
upon case precedent and public policy concerns.87
A. Definition of Relevance; Admissibility Generally
Rule 401 provides a definition of relevance which accomplishes
three ends: it states a test of relevance; it combines the concept of
materiality with relevance; and it ensures that evidence relating to
the credibility of witnesses or hearsay declarants is relevant. Before
discussing each of these ends, it is helpful to examine the Advisory
Committee's view of relevance:
Relevancy is not an inherent characteristic of any item of evidence
but exists only as a relation between an item of evidence and a
matter properly provable in the case. Does the item of evidence
tend to prove the matter sought to be proved?"8
This relationship between the item of evidence and proposition to
be proved can also be referred to as the probative value of the
evidence and is synonymous with relevance. 9
The definition in Rule 401 states the test of relevance as follows:
"Relevant evidence means evidence having any tendency to make
the existence of any fact . . . more probable or less probable than
it would be without the evidence." This test of relevance is one that
may be labeled "logical relevance" and is concerned only that logic
and experience tend to show that the item of evidence is relevant.
This view was first announced by Professor Thayer 0 and can be
contrasted with Professor Wigmore's view that evidence must also
be legally relevant or have a plus value relating to the admission of
a similar item of evidence established by case precedent." There are
two differences between these approaches: first, in the process of
admitting evidence, and second, in the test of probative value.
Thayer's process is to determine whether evidence is probative ac-
cording to logic and experience and then to determine whether some
other rule of evidence would exclude it."2 Wigmore's process first
determines whether the evidence is probative according to logic and
87. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evil. 401, 56 F.R.D. 183, 215 (1972).
88. Id.
89. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 433; Slough, Relevency Unraveled, 5 U. KAN. L. REv.
1,1(1956).
90. THAYER, supra note 86, at 264.
91. WIOMORE, supra note 21, § 12 at 298, § 28 at 409.
92. THAYER, supra note 86, at 264.
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experience, then whether the evidence should be admitted accord-
ing to previous rulings by courts and finally determines whether
some other rule of evidence would exclude it. 3
Wigmore's approach has been criticized because "legal reason-
ing" cannot be better than logic itself, because it demands the trial
judge adhere to a vast number of cases when making rulings from
the bench, 4 and because it can lead to confusion between admissi-
bility of evidence and sufficiency of evidence to allow a case to go
to a jury."5 This confusion can result in requiring each item of evi-
dence to appear in and of itself sufficient to allow a finding of the
proposition by the jury, or to require a higher degree of probative
value for an item to be relevant.
Rule 401, which adopts Thayer's approach, rejects all this and
requires only that evidence have probative value according to logic
and experience. There are no degrees of relevancy: "a fact is rele-
vant or irrelevant; there can be no middle ground."9 This test of
relevance is less stringent than Wigmore's, and requires only a tend-
ency to prove the existence or nonexistence of a fact. As the Advi-
sory Committee's Note indicates, any more stringent requirement
would be unworkable and unrealistic. 7 Therefore, when a witness
testifies, he is not expected to prove each entire proposition for
which he presents any item of evidence; "a link in the chain should
be enough."9 This is consistent with tests of relevancy expressed by
Montana cases.99
The second accomplishment of the definition occurs with the
language "fact that is of consequence to the determination of the act
• . ." which has the effect of combining materiality with relevance.
The distinction between relevance and materiality is often difficult
to make in actual practice. However, it can be stated generally that
relevance is concerned with whether a particular item of evidence
tends to prove a proposition at issue in the case as determined by
logic and experience, while materiality is concerned with whether a
proposition itself is properly provable in the case as determined by
the pleadings, procedural rules and substantive law. The reason the
definition combined the two concepts is that "it has the advantage
of avoiding the loosely used and ambiguous word 'material.' "00 An
93. WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 12 at 298.
94. Slough, supra note 89, at 11.
95. Weinstein & Berger, Basic Rules of Relevancy in the Proposed Federal Rules of
Evidence, 4 GA. L. REv. 43, 56 (1969).
96. Slough, supra note 89, at 2.
97. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EviD. 401, 56 F.R.D. 183, 216 (1972).
98. Peterfund, Relevancy and Its Limits in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence for
US. District Courts: Article IV, 25 REc. 80, 81 (1970).
99. E.g., Rhodes v. Weigand, 145 Mont. 542, 546, 402 P.2d 588, 590 (1965).
100. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 401, 56 F.R.D. 183, 216 (1972).
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example of a fact not of consequence to the action would be the rape
victim's character in such a prosecution, as ordinarily excluded by
statute. 101
The third accomplishment of the definition occurs in its second
sentence, which indicates that relevant evidence includes "evidence
bearing upon the credibility of a witness or hearsay declarant." This
was added to the Federal definition to prevent the exclusion of this
type of evidence under a technical interpretation of the definition
in Rule 401 and mandate of Rule 402 to admit relevant evidence but
exclude irrelevant evidence. 2 It is possible to view evidence relating
to credibility as having no tendency to prove facts of consequence
to the action,03 but this sentence solves any such problems.
It should also be noted that the definition of relevance is in-
tended to include demonstrative evidence or physical objects as
evidence which enable the court and jury to understand the case.
The Advisory Committee's Note and Commission Comment make
this clear and courts should allow all such evidence.'" 4
Rule 402 provides the basic rule that all relevant evidence is
admissible, with exceptions, and all irrelevant evidence is not ad-
missible, with no exceptions. The latter part of the Rule, that irrele-
vant evidence is not admissible, has been called "a presupposition
involved in the very conception of a rational system of evi-
dence. . . ."05 The exceptions to the rule that all relevant evidence
is admissible are provided by these Rules, statutes, and the United
States and Montana Constitutions. Any rule of evidence providing
for exclusion has the effect of excluding potentially relevant evi-
dence. Certainly there are statutes which exclude relevant evi-
dence. 1' Finally, the constitutional provisions providing exclusion
relate to the exclusionary rule and statements elicited in violation
of right to counsel. 07
Rule 403 is the first rule excluding relevant evidence. It ex-
cludes evidence on the basis that the probative value of the evidence
is substantially outweighed by its prejudicial, confusing, or time
wasting effect. Obviously this rule must be applied by the trial
judge and places heavy reliance on the judge's discretion. The com-
mon law has long recognized the need for flexibility in determining
admissiblity when balancing probative value and need for evidence
against harmful effects it might cause to the jury, because no num-
101. R.C.M. 1947, § 94-5-503(5) (Supp. 1977).
102. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EvID. 401.
103. Id.
104. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EviD. 401, 56 F.R.D. 183, 216 (1972).
105. THAYER, supra note 86, at 264.
106. See Commission Comment to MONT. R. EvID. 402 for examples.
107. See id. for citations to constitutional provisions and cases.
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ber of rules could possibly meet all the situations occurring during
trial. '
An important aspect of the rule is what grounds may be used
to exclude relevant evidence. It is apparent that the rule divides its
"countervailing elements" into two groups: dangers and considera-
tions. 109 In the "dangers" group are included elements which
threaten the jury trial process, specifically unfair prejudice, confu-
sion of the issues, and misleading the jury. As the Commission
Comment notes, unfair prejudice is intended to convey the usual
meaning of prejudice, but some further explanation is helpful. The
Advisory Committee states that unfair prejudice means "an undue
tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly,
though not necessarily, an emotional one." " 0 Confusion of the issues
arises most frequently when collateral issues are raised, creating a
trial within a trial, and sidelining the main issues to be decided in
the case."' Misleading the jury is similar to confusion of issues, but
relates to specific evidence which could be misunderstood, such as
tests or experiements with subtle differences from the actual events
on trial, and so the jury is misled as to the meaning of the evi-
dence." 2 In the "considerations" group are the latter three elements
of the rule, undue delay, waste of time, and needless presentation
of cumulative evidence. Again, some distinction is helpful. Undue
delay might result from needless jury views of the premises or scene
of the incident or from time spent setting up a demonstration which
proves very little. Waste of time might result from offering evidence
on conceded issues. Cumulative evidence means offering several
witnesses to prove a point when two or three would be sufficient." 3
The Advisory Committee indicates that it was not included because
a continuance, not exclusion of the evidence, is a more appropriate
remedy."' As the Commission Comment to Montana Rule 403 indi-
cates, this Rule is consistent with Montana statutes and cases.
B. Character Evidence
Two considerations which are helpful to the analysis of prob-
lems connected with character evidence are the purpose for which
such evidence is used and the manner in which it is proven."5 There
are two purposes for which character evidence may be used. Charac-
108. Slough, supra note 89, at 13.
109. Schmertz, Relevancy and Its Policy Counterweights: A Brief Excursion Through
Article IV of the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 33 FED. B.J. 1, 5 (1974).
110. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 403, 56 F.R.D. 183, 218 (1972).
111. Schmertz, supra note 109, at 6.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EviD. 403, 56 F.R.D. 183, 218 (1972).
115. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 442-43.
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ter may be an element of a crime, claim, or defense and is said to
be in issue, or character evidence may be introduced to create an
inference that a person acted in conformity with the proven charac-
ter trait and is said to be used circumstantially." ' There are three
means of proving character: reputation evidence as to the existence
of a character trait, opinion testimony as to the existence of a char-
acter trait, and specific acts reflecting a character trait. These types
of proof are listed "in order of their pungency and persuasiveness"
and their "tendency to arouse undue prejudice, to confuse and dis-
tract, to engender time-consuming side issues and to create risk of
surprise.""' 7 That is, specific acts most directly show a character
trait but may not be truly representative and are likely to lead to a
trial within a trial as to the existence of a character trait, while this
is less likely with the other two methods.
Rule 404 covers problems of admissiblity of character evidence
and so deals with the first consideration, the purpose for which
character evidence may be used. Rule 405 covers problems of
method of proof of character evidence and so deals with the second
consideration.
Rule 404(a) gives the three limited instances in which character
evidence may be used circumstantially. First, to prove that he did
not commit the crime for which he is on trial, the accused may
present evidence of his pertinent good character trait and the prose-
cution may rebut this with evidence of his bad character. Second,
to prove that he acted reasonably or was not the first aggressor, the
accused may present evidence of a pertinent character trait (proba-
bly violent behavior) of the victim. The prosecution may rebut such
evidence, and in certain cases may rebut any evidence that the
victim was the first aggressor with evidence of the victim's peaceful
character. Third, to prove the credibility of a witness in any case,
civil or criminal, any party may present character evidence relating
to truthfulness or untruthfulness as provided in Rule 608. Circum-
stantial use of character evidence is limited to these instances be-
cause often its probative value is limited when balanced against
prejudicial impact."' The limitations recognized in this rule are
consistent with Montana law. The Commission Comment indicates
that with the exception of character of witnesses, circumstantial use
of character evidence is limited to criminal cases. Allowing the pros-
ecution to use evidence of peaceful character traits of the victim to
rebut any evidence, not just evidence that he was the first aggressor,
is new to Montana law.
116. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 404(a), 56 F.R.D. 183, 220 (1972).
117. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 443.
118. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 404(a), 56 F.R.D. 183, 220-21 (1972).
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Rule 404(b) is concerned with a special kind of character evi-
dence, evidence of the commission of other crimes by the accused.
This subdivision is consistent with the universally recognized rule
that "evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to
prove character as a basis for suggesting the inference that conduct
on a particular occasion was in conformity with it.""' This is in
conformity with Rule 404(a) limiting the circumstantial use of char-
acter evidence. There is a requirement for a subdivision dealing with
other crimes because, despite the prohibition implicit in subdivision
(a) and expressed in subdivision (b), this type of evidence may be
used for purposes of other than implying that the accused commit-
ted the crime for which he is on trial. The second sentence of subdi-
vision (b) indicates some of these purposes, but use of the language
"such as" denotes that the list is not exclusive. The purposes for
which other crimes may be proven, as listed in the rule, include
"motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, ident-
ity, or absence of mistake or accident."
This subdivision is consistent with existing Montana law, but
is a change from earlier practice. At one time Montana had the rule
that evidence of other crimes was not admissible for any purpose. 20
This was eventually overruled and the usual exceptions recog-
nized.'2 However, it should be noted that one recent case indicated
that the admissibility of other crimes should not be automatic and
that courts should weigh the probative value of the other crimes
evidence against the prejudice bound to result from this type of
evidence, a balancing similar to that under Rule 403.122
Rule 404(c) is original and not found in the Federal Rules. It is
apparent that the Advisory Committee recognized character in issue
from their Note to Rule 404(a) and treatment in Rule 405(b); how-
ever, they chose not to treat character in issue in Rule 404, dealing
with admissiblity of character evidence, because they did not be-
lieve a relevancy problem existed. 123 However, the Commission con-
cluded that a rule on the admissibility of character evidence should
include this subdivision stating that when a person's character is an
element of a claim, charge, or defense it is admissible. A question
left unanswered by Rule 404(c) is what places character in issue:
while an attack may be accomplished in the pleadings' 21 or presenta-
119. Id. at 221.
120. State v. Searle, 125 Mont. 467, 471, 239 P.2d 995, 997 (1952) (any other crime);
State v. Sauter, 125 Mont. 109, 144, 232 P.2d 731, 731-32 (1951) (other sex crimes).
121. State v. Jensen, 153 Mont. 233, 238, 455 P.2d 631, 633-34 (1969); State v. Tully,
148 Mont. 166, 169, 418 P.2d 549, 550 (1960).
122. State v. Skinner, 163 Mont. 58, 64, 515 P.2d 81, 84 (1973).
123. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvyD. 404(a), 56 F.R.D. 183, 220-21 (1972).
124. Puutio v. Roman, 79 Mont. 226, 229, 255 P. 730, 731 (1927).
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tion of evidence, evidence of the good character of a party is not
allowed unless that character is attacked.'25
Rule 405 is concerned with methods of proving character. Sub-
division (a) covers the first two methods. The first, which is the
most usually accepted and recognized in Montana, is proof of char-
acter by reputation. This method relied upon what others in the
community say about a person's particular character trait and is
presented through the testimony of a person who must be shown to
have lived in the community and to have heard reports about the
character trait in question.'26 This method of proof has lost some of
its validity because in modern society the likelihood that a person
has a reputation for certain character traits is much less than in
times past.'27 In fact, the absence of any bad reports of a person's
character has been allowed to give rise to the inference that the
person is of good character.' These considerations led the Commis-
sion and the Advisory Committee to allow the second method of
proof, opinion evidence. This allows proof of character by the testi-
mony of the person's acquaintances based upon their own personal
opinions, not the reputation or opinion of the community as a whole.
This is a much more realistic view of what a witness testifies to when
presenting character testimony, for many witnesses testifying to
good character through reputation are relying on their own opinions.
This is an expansion of existing Montana law, as indicated in the
Commission Comment to this rule. The second sentence of Rule
405(a) allows specific instances of conduct to be inquired into on
cross-examination of character witnesses and is intended to allow
the adverse party to test either the reputation, knowledge, or opin-
ion of the witness by reports contrary to their testimony. This codi-
fies the rule of Michelson v. United States'29 and is recognized in
Montana.'1
In contrast to this provision, Rule 405(b) allows specific instan-
ces of conduct to be used as a method of proof of character traits,
but only where character is in issue, or the character of the victim
relates to the reasonableness of force used by the accused. In the
first situation, use of this method is justified because if character is
in issue, it is not a side issue and there is no danger of confusing the
125. Meinecke v. Skaggs, 123 Mont. 308, 311, 213 P.2d 237, 239 (1949); See R.C.M.
1947, § 93-1901-13.
126. State v. Moorman, 133 Mont, 148, 152, 321 P.2d 236, 238-39 (1958).
127. Slough, supra note 89, at 413.
128. Matusevitz v. Hughes, 26 Mont. 212, 217, 67 P. 467, 468 (1902); State v. Shafer,
22 Mont. 17, 18, 55 P. 526, 527 (1898).
129. 335 U.S. 469 (1948).
130. State v. Moorman, 133 Mont. 148, 153, 321 P.2d 236, 239 (1958).
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jury. 131 The second situation is a recognition of the unique Montana
case law allowance of the use of this method by the defendant, noted
in the Commission Comment.
C. Habit; Routine Practice
Rule 406 is concerned with habit and routine practice. The
Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 40632 emphasized the
distinction between habit and character evidence. The Commission
decided that a distinction should be made between these terms
because character evidence is generally excluded while habit evi-
dence is generally admitted, and further because the two terms are
very often confused. Therefore, Rule 406(a) presents the following
definition of the terms habit and routine practice: "A habit is a
person's regular response to a repeated specific situation. A routine
practice is a regular course of conduct of a group of persons or an
organization." Thus, a routine practice is the habit of a group. On
the other hand, character is "a generalized description of one's dis-
position, or of one's disposition in respect to a general trait, such as
honesty, temperance, or peacefulness."' 33 An example pointing out
the differences may be helpful. In an action for the wrongful death
of X at a railway crossing, the plaintiff offers two types of evidence;
first, that X was a careful, cautious man and second, that X always
stopped and looked carefully before crossing the particular railway
crossing at which he was killed. The first type of evidence is charac-
ter evidence offered circumstantially to show that on the particular
occasion X was careful; this should be excluded because it is not one
of the permissible uses under Rule 404. However, the second type
of evidence is a regular response to a repeated specific situation and
so is habit evidence and admissible under Rule 406.' 31 Other notions
of habit are that it is "semi-automatic, almost involuntary, and
invariable specific responses to a fairly specific stimuli."' 35 The rea-
son habit evidence is admissible is the reliability with which an
habitual response would occur: it is highly likely that the person
acted in conformity with the habit during the event which is basis
of the case.' 3 However, it is much less likely that a person would
act in conformity to a character trait in the same situation, because
the response is not as automatic, and certainly not involuntary. For
this reason it is not generally admissible.
131. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 405, 56 F.R.D. 183, 222 (1972).
132. 56 F.R.D. 183, 223 (1972).
133. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 462.
134. MODEL CODE OF EVIDENCE rule 307, Comment at 190 (1942).
135. Schmertz, supra note 105, at 14.
136. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 463.
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Rule 406(b) simply provides that habit evidence is admissible,
whether or not corroborated and whether or not there were eyewit-
nesses. The problems of corroboration and eyewitnesses probably
arose because courts did not fully accept habit evidence or confused
it with character evidence.'37 The Advisory Committee views corro-
boration as a requirement going to the sufficiency or weight of the
evidence, not its admissibility.'38 In some jurisdictions, the eyewit-
ness requirement allowed the presence of an eyewitness to prevent
the admission of habit evidence, probably because it was unneces-
sary. Yet eyewitness testimony is not so accurate or unbiased that
adverse evidence should be excluded.'39 Thus the Rule admits habit
evidence despite eyewitnesses.
Rule 406(c) is the equivalent to Federal Rule 406(b) and indi-
cates that habit may be proved by opinion or by specific instances
of conduct sufficient to warrant a finding of habit. The criterion for
determining the existence of a habit is that the person responded
to the specific situation a sufficient number of times to make the
response a regular one. 40 Evidence showing that the person has not
absolutely and invariably acted in conformity with the habit may
go to the weight of the evidence if it is not sufficient to exclude the
evidence as not qualifying as a habit.'' Care should be taken so that
a foundation unsuccessfully attempting to prove habit does not per-
suade the jury that the habit did exist.
The remaining rules in Article IV have been classified as rules
of express or implied admissions. They deal with evidence of a
party's conduct which may indicate his lack of belief in his own
case.' In fact, although the admission theory does not apply to all
of these rules, an important public policy consideration does exist
for each of them and is the reason for excluding evidence where it
is offered for purposes contrary to that public policy. It is important
to remember that when evidence is permitted under the exceptions
to these rules, it may be used only for a limited purpose. Thus,
under Rule 105 a cautionary limiting instruction is available to the
party against whom the evidence is offered. It is also important to
remember that the provisions of Rule 403 would exclude evidence,
even though allowed by one of these rules, if its probative value is
light and prejudicial impact great, particularly where there is other
evidence to prove the same point. Without this caveat the excep-
tions could easily swallow the rules.
137. Slough, supra note 89, at 450.
138. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 406(a), 56 F.R.D. 183, 224-25 (1972).
139. Slough, supra note 89, at 446-47.
140. Lewan, The Rationale of Habit Evidence, 16 SY.&cusE L. REv. 39, 48 (1964).
141. MCCORMICK supra note 22, at 463.
142. Schmertz, supra note 109, at 15.
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D. Subsequent Remedial Measures
Rule 407 excludes evidence of a repair made after an incident
when this evidence is offered to prove negligence or culpable con-
duct. It is apparent that the subsequent repair is not always an
admission of liability. Such conduct can be explained by the fact
that the incident was an accident, the cause of which was nobody's
fault, or there could have been contributory negligence or a high
degree of comparative negligence, or the party could have made the
repair simply out of humane impulses, wishing to prevent anyone
else from being injured in the same fashion.' So, the admission
theory is not a sufficient reason to exclude such evidence. The main
reason for the existence of the rule is the public policy that repairs
to dangerous conditions should be encouraged, or at least not dis-
couraged by the threat that making of repairs will subject the re-
pairing party to an unfavorable inference in litigation.' 4
The rule is intended to cover any type of action which would
make the event less likely to occur and so covers everything from
the typical repair of a faulty stairway to changes in operating rules
or regulations, discharge of employees and installation of safety
devices. 45 The rule excludes such evidence only when it is offered
to show negligence or culpable conduct. The second sentence pro-
vides an open-ended list of exceptions, including proof of ownership,
control, feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment. An example of ownership or control is provided by a
Montana case'46 in which evidence that the rock causing the plain-
tiff's injuries was removed from a certain street by the defendant
city to prove that it had assumed control of the street and was under
the obligation to keep it under repair. A further exception contained
in Montana cases, but not listed in the Rule, is the admissibility of
subsequent changes or repairs for the purpose of explaining condi-
tions existing at the time of the accident.'47 The Advisory Commit-
tee's Note explains a condition for the use of these exceptions:
The requirement that the other purpose be controverted calls for
automatic exclusion unless a genuine issue be present and allows
the adverse party to lay the groundwork for exclusion by making
an admission. Otherwise, the factors of undue prejudice, confusion
of issues, misleading the jury, and waste of time remain for consid-
eration under Rule 403.11
143. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 407, 56 F.R.D. 183, 225-26 (1972).
144. Id. at 226.
145. Id.
146. May v. City of Anaconda, 26 Mont. 140, 144, 66 P. 759, 761 (1901).
147. Pullen v. City of Butte, 45 Mont. 46, 53, 121 P. 878, 879-80 (1912); Teesdale v.
Anschutz Drilling Co., 138 Mont. 427, 440, 357 P.2d 4, 11 (1960).
148. 56 F.R.D. 183, 226 (1972).
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Finally, it is of interest that a rule equivalent to Rule 407149 was
applied in a products liability case in California. 50 That case held
evidence of a change from aluminum to malleable iron in gearbox
product was admissible because these cases do not require evidence
of either negligence or culpable conduct, because the public policy
of encouraging repairs by excluding such evidence does not apply to
products liability case defendants who mass produce thousands of
items and would be relieved of tremendous liability by making such
changes, and because in products liability cases the emphasis shifts
from the conduct of the defendant to the character of the product.",
A contrary argument is that strict liability applies to all manufac-
turers, even small ones, and that these manufacturers should not be
discouraged from making repairs.
E. Compromise and Offers of Compromise, Payments of Expenses
and Offers to Plead Guilty
Rule 408 has the effect of excluding proof of compromise, or
offers of compromise when offered to prove liability for or invalidity
of a claim. Logically viewed, an offer is not necessarily an admission
because it does not show the party believes his case is weak, only
that he desires settlement. Yet as the amount of the compromise
offer approaches the amount claimed, this suggestion becomes less
valid.' 2 Again, although this type of evidence may be relevant, the
public policy which favors the settlement of disputes without resort
to litigation demands its exclusion.'53 The second sentence of Rule
408 provides a change from the common law and a Montana case5 4
by stating that evidence of conduct or statements made during ne-
gotiations is not admissible. The common law rule allowed admis-
sions made during compromise negotiations to be used against a
party if that admission did not refer to the settlement itself. Of
course this did not encourage open and frank negotiations and was
contrary to the policy of the rule. However, a party may not take
advantage of this rule to try to immunize evidence by presenting it
in negotiations because its third sentence provides that it does not
exclude the content of such statements if the statements are other-
wise discoverable. The final sentence provides exceptions to the
Rule, allowing evidence of compromise for other purposes such as
149. CAL. EVID. CODE § 1151 (West).
150. Ault v. International Harvester Co., 13 Cal.3d 113, 117-18, 528 P.2d 1148, 1150,
117 Cal. Rptr. 812, 814 (1975).
151. See Sutkowski v. Universal Marion Corp., 5 111. App.3d 313, 319, 281 N.E.2d 749,
753 (1972) (holding a provision similar to Rule 407 also not applicable to these cases).
152. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 408, 56 F.R.D. 183, 227 (1972).
153. Id.
154. Lenahan v. Casey, 46 Mont. 367, 379, 128 P. 601, 605 (1912).
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to prove bias or prejudice of a witness, to negative a contention of
undue delay, or to prove an effort to obstruct criminal proceedings.
Rule 409 excludes evidence of payment of expenses occasioned
by an injury or occurrence. It differs from Federal Rule 409 which
only includes evidence of offers to pay medical expenses. The reason
for the difference lies in the different views of the Advisory Commit-
tee and the Commission. The Advisory Committee Note to Federal
Rule 409 '55 adopts the position that offers to pay medical expenses
are made out of humane impulses, while the Commission concluded
that whatever the reason for making such offers, humanitarian mo-
tives are seldom responsible. The Commission also felt that offers
to pay are often coupled with admissions of liability and that valua-
ble evidence may be lost by excluding such statements. The Advi-
sory Committee followed similar reasoning in indicating that state-
ments not related to offers of payment should be admissible under
Federal Rule 409, even though contrary to similar provisions under
Rule 408, because factual statements are "incidental in nature'""
with offers of payment but not with offers of compromise. The Com-
mission changed the Federal Rule to include offers of any kind,
rather than those for medical expense, because they are inadmissi-
ble under Montana statutes.'7 The policy reason these payments
are excluded is to encourage the settlement of claims by encouraging
payment without such payment becoming evidence to be used
against the person making it.
Rule 410 allows an accused in a criminal action to offer to plead
guilty or nolo contendere or to withdraw such a plea without fear
that this offer or withdrawal will be used against him in a trial on
that charge. It is based upon the same considerations as Rule 408,
on Compromise and Offers of Compromise, that making such a plea
or offer to plea may have no bearing on the guilt or innocence of the
accused and upon the policy of encouraging settlement of criminal
cases. In addition, it is difficult to believe that an accused could
receive a fair trial from a jury which knows that he has offered or
withdrawn a plea of guilty.'5 8 The Rule includes provisions which
prevent the accused from abusing this Rule and which allow use of
statements for impeachment purposes or subsequent prosecution for
perjury or false statement.
155. 56 F.R.D. 183, 228 (1972).
156. Id.
157. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-2201-7 to 2201-10 (Supp. 1977).
158. Note, Relevancy and Its Limits in the Proposed Federal Rules of Evidence, 16
WAYNE L. REv. 167, 190 (1969).
[Vol. 39
32
Montana Law Review, Vol. 39 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/4
RULES OF EVIDENCE
F. Liability Insurance
The final Rule in Article IV deals with liability insurance, pro-
viding that evidence that a person was insured is not admissible
upon the issue of whether he acted negligently or otherwise wrong-
fully. The reasons for this rule are that a person's insurance coverage
is not relevant nor is it an admission of fault,'59 and that it is highly
likely that juries will misuse this information by increasing damage
awards.'" In fact, the results of one test in which an identical trial
was shown to three different "mock" juries resulted in a $33,000
damage award when there was no mention of insurance, a $37,000
award when insurance was mentioned, and a $47,000 award when
insurance was mentioned and a cautionary instruction given, even
though the juries did not mention insurance in their deliberations.'"
Montana law is unique in this area. While the rule is generally
followed that a party's liability insurance is not admissible' 2 and
evidence that a party does not have insurance is equally inadmissi-
ble,' 3 the rule is also followed that injection of the fact of insurance
into a case can result in reversible error.' 4 However, decisions by the
Montana supreme court recognize exceptions to the reversible error
rule where the insured party mentions insurance during voir dire,'
65
where an admission of liability contains mention of insurance,'66 and
where insurance is injected in the case by a witness for the insured
party through a "voluntary, unresponsive, and incidental an-
swer."'6 7 One case has indicated that the reversible error rule is used
only after an examination of the facts and circumstances of the
mention of insurance, and that reversal should not automatically
follow.'6 8 As the Commission Comment to this rule indicates, there
are several factors to be considered in determining whether to re-
verse, including whether the substantial rights of the insured party
are affected and whether the judgment is excessive. These consider-
ations take on significance in light of the second sentence of this
Rule which permits evidence of insurance to be used for purposes
other than to show liability, such as to demonstrate agency, owner-
ship or control, or bias or prejudice of a witness. The Commission
concluded that there is a legitimate use of insurance evidence under
159. McCoawcK, supra note 22, at 479.
160. Broeder, The University of Chicago Jury Project, 38 NEB. L. Rv. 744, 754 (1959).
161. Id.
162. Wilson v. Blair, 65 Mont. 155, 172, 211 P. 289, 295 (1922).
163. Doheny v. Cloverdale, 104 Mont. 534, 555, 68 P.2d 142, 148 (1937).
164. D'Hoodge v. McCann, 151 Mont. 353, 359, 443 P.2d 747, 750 (1968).
165. Francis v. Heidel, 104 Mont. 580, 588, 68 P.2d 583, 586 (1937).
166. Tanner v. Smith, 97 Mont. 229, 238, 33 P.2d 547, 511 (1937).
167. Meinecke v. International Transp. Co., 101 Mont. 315, 324, 55 P.2d 680,682 (1936).
168. Francis v. Heidel, 104 Mont. 580, 588, 68 P.2d 583, 585 (1937).
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exceptions in the Rule. With the considerations imposed by cases
on the reversible error rule in mind, this new Rule can be used
consistently with existing Montana law.
V. ARTICLE V PRIVILEGES
Article V, Privileges, reflects Congress' unique approach to Ar-
ticle V of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Congress changed Article
V from one with rules on several of the individual privileges and
rules applying to all privileges to a single rule applying the federal
common law of privileges in federal civil and criminal cases and the
state law of privileges in civil actions in which state law supplies the
rule of decision. The Uniform Rules (1974) adopted the draft re-
jected by Congress. The Commission decided to adopt rules from
the Uniform Rules which affect all privileges and clarify aspects of
waiver of privilege and comment on claims of privilege. The reasons
for the Commission's action are basically concerned with the unique
nature of privileges in the law of evidence, and are explained in the
Introductory Comment to Article V.
A. Rule 501. Privileges recognized only as provided
Rule 501 has the effect of incorporating all privileges recognized
by rules of procedure, statute, and constitution but recognizes only
those privileges. This has the added effect of cutting off any further
recognition of privileges by case law and so required adoption, in
Rule 502, of a particular privilege recognized only by decisional law
in Montana. This rule also sets out the four elements of a testimo-
nial privilege allowing a person: to refuse to be a witness, to disclose
any matter, to produce any object or writing, or to prevent another
person from taking any of these actions.
B. Rule 502. Identity of Informer
Rule 502 is the only rule dealing with a specific privilege. Recog-
nition of the privilege against disclosure of an informer's identity is
made necessary by Rule 501 which cuts off further recognition of
privileges by case law and recognizes only those in rules of proce-
dure, statute and constitution. This privilege has been recognized
only by case law in Montana' 9 and so had to be included in this rule
if it was to be recognized as a continuing part of Montana law.
This privilege is unique in several aspects. Generally, a confi-
dential relationship which gives rise to a testimonial privilege allows
169. State v. Hall, 158 Mont. 6, 17, 487 P.2d 1314, 1320 (1971); State ex rel. Offerdahl
v. District Court, 156 Mont. 432, 435, 481 P.2d 338, 340 (1970).
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the parties to that relationship to be the holders of a privilege,
insures that no one testifies as to the substance of their confidential
communications, and allows the holders to waive the privilege.
However, the privilege bestowed in Rule 502(a) is held by the United
States or a state or subdivision thereof, not the informer. Thus, only
the government may claim the privilege under Rule 502(b). The
privilege covers only the identity of the informer, not the substance
of his communication. The privilege may be waived by the informer,
under Rule 502(c) even though he does not hold the privilege. How-
ever, these unique aspects are consistent with the purpose of the
privilege as expressed by the leading United States Supreme Court
ruling in Roviaro v. United States:17 0
The purpose of the privilege is the furtherance and protection of
the public interest in effective law enforcement. The privilege rec-
ognizes the obligation of citizens to communicate their knowledge
of the commission of crimes to law enforcement officials, and by
preserving their anonimity, encourages them to perform that obli-
gation.
The scope of the privilege is limited by its underlying purpose.
Thus, where the disclosure of the contents of the communication
will not tend to reveal the identity of an informer, the contents are
not privileged. Likewise, once the identity of the informer has been
disclosed to those who would have cause to resent the communica-
tion, the privilege is no longer applicable.
Finally, Rule 502(c) specifies the exceptions and limitations of the
rule. Roviaro indicates that when the identity of the informer be-
comes known the privilege is waived, and subdivision (c) indicates
this waiver may be accomplished by the holder of the privilege (the
government), the informer's own action, or by having the informer
testify. The other limitation of the privilege stated in Rule 502(c)(2)
is also taken from Roviaro. "I
A further limitation on the applicability of the privilege arises from
the fundamental requirements of fairness. Where the disclosure of
an informer's identity, or the contents of his communication is
relevant and helpful to the defense of an accused, or is essential
to a fair determination of a cause, the privilege must give way. In
these situations the trial court may require disclosure and, if the
government withholds the information, dismiss the action.
The Rule allows the public entity which invokes the privilege to
show facts relevant to determining whether the informer can supply
testimony relevant to such a fair determination of the action, and
170. 353 U.S. 53, 59-60 (1959).
171. Id. at 60.
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if the court finds the public entity should disclose the identity and
it elects not to do so, the court may dismiss the charges in a criminal
case or make any order that justice requires in a civil case. The test
for making this determination was also stated in Roviaro and ap-
proved in Montana:'
We believe that no fixed rule with respect to disclosure is justifia-
ble. The problem is one that calls for balancing the public interest
in protecting the flow of information against the individual's right
to prepare his defense. Whether a proper balance renders nondis-
closure erroneous must depend upon the particular circumstances
of each case, taking into consideration the crime charged, the pos-
sible defenses, the possible significance of the informer's testimony
and other relevant factors.
C. Waiver of Privilege by Voluntary Disclosure: Non-waiver in
Certain Instances
Rules 503 and 504 are concerned with all privileges generally
and with disclosure of privileged information as it affects waiver.
Rule 503(a) is taken from Uniform Rule (1974) 510. It codifies the
common law rule that when a person ceases to treat a matter as
privileged, the privilege terminates. The Advisory Committee's
Note 3 indicates the rationale of this rule: "[T]he central purpose
of most privileges is the promotion of some interest or relationship
by endowing it with a supporting secrecy or confidentiality. It is
evident that the privilege should terminate when the holder by his
own acts destroys the confidentiality."
The Commission Comment details the correct application of
the Rule, for the intention of the holder of the privilege is not the
only factor to be considered. Wigmore has proposed a test that is
concerned with fairness, for at a certain point an objective view
would determine there has been a waiver, despite the subjective
intention of the holder not to voluntarily disclose. His test further
considers consistency, for at that same point, almost any person
would determine a disclosure had been made, despite subjective
intentions of the holder.14 The subdivision therefore does not re-
quire knowledge of waiver by the holder to waive the privilege: the
use of the word "voluntary" is intended to take into account the
next rule, Rule 504. The subdivision also uses the phrase
"substantial part" to allow a person to disclose anything up to a
"substantial part" of the communication before waiver is accom-
172. Id. at 62; State ex rel. Offerdahl v. District Court, 156 Mont. 432, 436, 481 P.2d
338, 340 (1971).
173. 56 F.R.D. 183, 259 (1972) (deleted by Congress).
174. 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 2327, at 636 (McNaughten Rev. 1961).
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plished. The subdivision is contrary to the common law and new to
Montana law on these two points.
Rule 503(b) governs the situation in which there are two or more
persons holding a privilege and the effect of waiver by one person
upon the other person's privilege. This subdivision provides that
such disclosure does not affect the other person's privilege, for the
holder of a privilege should not suffer the consequences from a
waiver over which he had no control.
Rule 504 deals with disclosure of privileged matters by the
holder when that disclosure is compelled erroneously or without
opportunity to claim the privilege. As the Commission Comment
indicates, the Rule in the first situation allows the holder to disclose
privileged matter under court order, yet still claim the privilege
later if it is found that the court was in error. The severe common
law rule that a person must exhaust all legal remedies or risk incar-
ceration to maintain his privilege was rejected. The second situation
concerns disclosure of privileged matters by persons other than the
holder without his knowledge. In this case the common law rule
allowing "eavesdroppers" to waive a privilege by disclosing privi-
leged matter is rejected.
D. Comment Upon or Inference From Claim of Privilege
Rule 505 is intended to allow holders of a privilege to claim their
privilege without fear that so doing will adversely affect them or the
parties for whom they are testifying. It does so by not allowing the
claims of a privilege to be a proper subject of comment by counsel
or the court and by not permitting an inference to be drawn from a
claim of privilege. It is obvious that when an adverse comment or
inference may be made, the effectiveness of privileges is greatly
lessened. As the Advisory Committee indicated, privileges are
"founded upon important policies and are entitled to maximum
effect." 7 5 Therefore, the jury should not be made aware of a claim
of privilege.
VI. ARTICLE VI WITNESSES
Article VI, Witnesses, is an important article because of its
breadth of coverage and changes to Montana law. There are three
distinct areas concerning witnesses: competency, or the legal fitness
of the person to testify, in Rules 601 through 606; impeachment of
the credibility of witnesses, in Rules 607 through 610 and 613; and
conduct of trial and rules of examination of witnesses, in Rules 611
175. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 513 (deleted by Congress), 56 F.R.D.
183, 260 (1972).
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through 615. The important changes brought about through this
article are abolition of the deadman's statutes in Rule 601, allow-
ance for impeachment of one's own witness in Rule 607, abolition
of the doctrine of sponsorship of witnesses in Rules 607 and 611,
abolition of impeachment for conviction of crime in Rule 609, and
changes in the foundation requirements for impeachment by prior
inconsistent statement in Rule 613.
A. Competency
1. In general.
Rule 601(a) indicates that all witnesses are competent, except
as otherwise provided. The Advisory Committee describes this as
"general ground-clearing [which] eliminates all grounds of incom-
petency not specifically recognized in succeeding rules. .. .
This represents a culmination of reform efforts in the area of witness
competency begun over a century ago. 77 The common law approach
excluded a witness as incompetent if it appeared at all likely that
the witness was unable or unwilling to tell the truth. T'7  Those
grounds can be categorized as the five i's: interest in the action;
insanity, in that a person suffering from mental illness did not have
the capacity to testify; infancy, in that a child did not have the
capacity to remember or understand what it is to tell the truth;
infidelity, in that a person who did not believe in a supreme being
could not be trusted to follow an oath; and infamy, in that a person
convicted of crime could not be trusted to tell the truth. 79 Some of
these grounds of incompetency have been transformed into a ground
of impeachment of the credibility of the witness,' s because certainly
hearing the witness' testimony for whatever it is worth is preferable
to no information at all.
When the rule of incompetency for interest was abolished, an
exception was carved out. Compromise forced the reformers to ex-
clude the testimony of persons testifying as to transactions between
themselves and deceased persons.'' This rule, commonly known as
the deadman's statute, is abolished by Rule 601(a), in that the
Rules do not mention it. The reasons for the Commission's decision
to abolish the deadman's statute in Montana rest upon several con-
siderations. First there is uncertainty over the application of the
176. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 601, 56 F.R.D. 183, 262 (1972).
177. MORGAN, supra note 35, at 80.
178. 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 576, at 686 (3d ed. 1940).
179. Slovenko, Witnesses, Psychiatry and Credibility of Testimony, 19 U. FLA. L. REV.
1, 3 (1969).
180. MCCORMNCK, supra note 22, at 139.
181. Id. at 142.
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statute due to conflicting case law interpretation. Second is the
Commission's belief that the deadman's statutes rest upon the false
premise that persons who have an interest should be excluded be-
cause this interest will cause them to lie. Third is the concern that
problems of perjury are not properly solved by excluding witnesses.
Finally, there are undesirable results from application of the dead-
man's statutes, which allow concern for deceased persons' estates to
supersede concern for living persons' property rights and which have
the effect of excluding valuable evidence.
The first rule of disqualification following Rule 601(a)'s "all
witnesses are competent" provision is found in Rule 601(b) which
excludes two categories of witnesses: those who are incapable of
expressing themselves and those that are incapable of understand-
ing the duty to tell the truth. As the Commission Comment points
out, these grounds are commonly used in Montana when the compe-
tency of insane persons and children is tested. The Commission
considered this Rule a necessary addition to the Federal Rules be-
cause no other provision specifically allowed a judge to exclude
witnesses on this basis.
2. Personal Knowledge.
Rule 602 provides the second rule of disqualification of wit-
nesses, that a person may not testify unless he has personal knowl-
edge of the facts about which he testifies. As the Commission Com-
ment points out, this is a universally recognized requirement consis-
tent with existing Montana law. The Rule is not intended to exclude
testimony of witnesses who are not capable of expressing themselves
with positiveness but do so clumsily,' s2 by use of such expressions
as "I believe" or "it was my impression" or "I suppose" or "I
guess". -83 Rather, it requires a foundation to be laid showing the
witness to have been in a position to observe the events about which
he testifies. An exception is provided in this Rule by cross-reference
to Rule 703, which allows an expert to base his opinion on the
observations of other persons and not his own personnal knowledge.
3. Oath or affirmation.
Rule 603, the third rule of disqualification for lack of compe-
tency, requires the witness to testify under oath or affirmation. This
Rule follows the current theory of oaths and affirmations, that they
182. State v. Vanella, 40 Mont. 326, 339, 106 P. 364, 368 (1910).
183. 2 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 658, at 768 (3d ed. 1940).
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are symbols intended to induce a feeling of obligation in witnesses
and to make them understand the penalty for not telling the truth.84
4. Interpreters.
Rule 604 provides a rule made necessary by the provisions of
Rule 601 which declares all witnesses to be competent unless they
are incapable of expressing themselves. This Rule allows persons
incapable of speaking English to have their testimony translated by
interpreters qualified under this Rule. The Rule requires that the
interpreter be administered an oath or affirmation and that he be
qualified as an expert in the interpretation of the language which
he is to translate. As the Commission Comment points out, the first
requirement is consistent with Montana law but the second is new.
The Rule should be used in conjunction with Rule 43(f), Montana
Rules of Civil Procedure, allowing the court to appoint an interpeter
at its discretion.
5. Judges.
Rule 605 provides the fifth rule of disqualification by com-
pletely disqualifying judges from testifying as witnesses at trials or
proceedings over which they are presiding. The Advisory Committee
stresses the importance of allowing the judge to maintain a role of
impartial arbiter, and of his maintaining that position throughout
trials. It emphasizes as well the difficulty of effective examination,
and the influence on the jury of the judge as a witness.185 Certainly,
the better policy is to not allow presiding judges to testify, as the
Commission concluded when it changed existing Montana law.'
6. Jury.
Rule 606(a) is the equivalent to Rule 605 on disqualification of
judges; it provides the sixth and final rule of disqualification, that
jurors are not allowed to testify in trials in which they are sitting.
As noted in the Commission Comment, it is impractical to believe
that there can be effective cross-examination of a juror, or that the
juror and jury could effectively weigh the juror's testimony against
contrary evidence. Thus it concluded that it was proper to change
existing Montana law187 to exclude jurors from testifying.
Rule 606(b) is concerned with a different problem than testi-
mony of jurors at the trial in which they are sitting. It deals with
184. MCCORMCK supra note 22, at 582.
185. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 605, 56 F.R.D. 183, 264 (1972).
186. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-701-5.
187. Id.
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the competency of a juror to testify as to the validity of a verdict or
indictment reached by the jury or grand jury of which he was a
member. The general rule is that a juror may not testify to impeach
the verdict reached by the jury upon which he sat. Wigmore be-
lieved the rule arose from three independent principles: the privi-
lege of jurors to keep all communications confidential; an extension
of the parole evidence rule making all motives, issues and behavior
leading up to a verdict incompetent evidence; and the rule that a
witness may not testify as to his own terpitude or the self-stultifying
rule applied to jurors.' 8 According to the Advisory Committee, "the
values sought to be promoted by excluding the evidence include
freedom of deliberation, stability and finality of verdicts, and pro-
tection of jurors against annoyance and embarrassment. .. .
However, the Rule is not one that absolutely bars juror testimony,
because "simply putting verdicts beyond effective reach can only
promote irregularity and injustice."'' 0 Therefore, Rule 606(b) delin-
eates what may not be testified to, including "any matter or state-
ment occurring during the course of the jury's deliberation, or...
the effect of anything upon his or any other juror's mind or emotions
• . . or concerning his mental processes. . . ." It goes on to state
that jurors may testify to the following matters occurring during the
course of the jury's deliberations: extraneous prejudicial informa-
tion; outside influence brought to bear upon any juror; and whether
the verdict was decided by a resort to chance. As the Commission
Comment indicates, until recently, no exceptions to the general rule
were allowed under Montana case law, but more recent decisions
provide exceptions which fit within the first two categories, and an
existing Montana statute'9 ' provides the third category.
B. Impeachment
Rules 607 through 610 and 613 are concerned with impeach-
ment, although only two Rules, 608 and 613, allow any specific types
of impeachment. The Commission Comment to Rule 607 indicates
that it concluded that the broad language of Rule 607, allowing the
credibility of witnesses to be attacked, means that impeachment by
traditional methods are incorporated in the Rules. Those methods
listed in the Comment include bias for or against any party in the
case, interest in the outcome, motive to testify falsely, lack of capac-
ity of the witness to perceive, recollect or communicate, and contra-
diction. Rule 608 allows impeachment by the use of character evi-
188. 8 WIGMORE ON EVIDNCE § 2345 at 667 (McNaughten Rev. 1961).
189. Advisory Committee's Note to FED.R. Evm. 606(b), 56 F.R.D. 183, 265 (1972).
190. Id.
191. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-5603(2).
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dence and Rule 613 impliedly allows impeachment through the use
of prior inconsistent statement by providing foundational require-
ments.
Rule 607 allows the credibility of any witness to be attacked by
any party, including the party calling him. The reason the Commis-
sion adopted this Rule, which is contrary to existing Montana law,
is that the traditional rule not permitting a party to impeach his
own witness was based upon two invalid assumptions. These were
that a party vouches for the credibility of his own witnesses and that
a party could coerce his own witness to testify as the party pleased
by intimidating the witness with impeachment, were it not for the
traditional rule.19 Further, the traditional rule as interpreted in
Montana had its exception allowing a party to impeach his own
witness if the testimony prejudiced his case and surprised him.
Since a party does not vouch for his witnesses, but generally takes
the persons available to testify as to the occurrence of an incident, 9 '
and as a practical matter can impeach his own witness when the
need arises by claiming prejudice and surprise, the effect of this
Rule is simply to remove the artifical barriers to allowing impeach-
ment of one's own witness. The corollary of the traditional rule that
a party may not impeach his own witness is that he is bound by the
testimony of witnesses he presents. The Commission considered it
logical that if impeachment of one's own witness is to be allowed,
then certainly no party could be bound by the testimony of any
witness and so incorporated this concept into Rule 607(b). This has
the effect of abolishing two of the five assorted rules comprising the
doctrine of sponsorship of witnesses, to be discussed in conjunction
with Rule 611(b).
Rule 608 allows impeachment by use of character evidence.
This Rule should be considered in conjunction with Rules 404 and
405 dealing with character evidence. As noted in the discussion of
those Rules, when character evidence is used circumstantially, there
is a problem as to whether the proof of the character trait is in fact
relevant to proof of the conduct which is to be inferred from it. In
this instance, is proof of a character trait a sufficient basis upon
which the trier of fact may infer that the person is or is not telling
the truth in the testimony given at that trial? The answer that Rule
608(a) provides is that use of reputation or opinion to prove a char-
acter trait of a witness is subject to the limitations that the evidence
may refer only to character for truthfulness or untruthfulness and
that evidence of truthful character may only be offered after the
192. See 3A WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE §§ 896-98 (Chadbourn Rev. 1970).
193. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 607, 56 F.R.D. 183, 266-67 (1972).
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witness' character has been attacked. The first limitation narrows
the scope of character evidence offered to impeach witnesses in that
Montana has provided that evidence of "reputation for truth, hon-
esty, and integrity" has been allowed.'94 Proof of character by opin-
ion is new to Montana, as indicated by the discussion of Rule 405.
The second limitation, also indicated in the discussion of Rule 405,
that proof of good character is allowed only after attack, is consis-
tent with Montana law.
Rule 608(b) is concerned with the problem of proof of character
through specific instances of conduct. As noted in the discussion of
Rule 405(b), this is the most persuasive and at the same time, the
most prejudicial means of proof of character. For example, if it is
shown that a witness has committed perjury in a previous trial, this
is persuasive "proof" that the character trait of not telling the truth
exists with that witness. However, does the fact that the witness has
committed perjury in the past really indicate whether or not he is
telling the truth now? Because of this problem, the use of specific
instances are limited, first, in the discretion of the court if probative
of truthfulness or untruthfulness; second, to the cross-examination
of either the witness whose character is being attacked or other
character witnesses; and finally by the general provision of the rule
not allowing proof of specific instances by extrinsic evidence. In
other words, specific instances of conduct cannot be proven by ex-
trinsic evidence and when they are used on cross-examination, the
court is to use its discretion to insure that the specific instance
actually occurred. The use of specific instances of conduct is a
change to existing Montana law, but under the limitations it is a
sensible change, and one that is necessary when Rule 609 is taken
into account.
Rule 609 changes Montana law by not allowing impeachment
for conviction of a crime. The Commission Comment indicates that
the Federal Rule has provisions not allowing this type of impeach-
ment if the witness has obtained a certificate of rehabilitation or
other equivalent procedure, but under constitutional and statutory
provisions in Montana' this would severely limit the use of this
type of impeachment. Under Montana practice the witness may be
asked if he has ever been convicted of a felony, but if an affirmative
answer is given, the inquiry is closed. Therefore, the Commission
felt adoption of the Federal Rule with Montana practice would re-
sult in a rule of limited usefulness allowing the question "Have you
194. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1901-11.
195. Note that State v. Gafford, - Mont. __, 563 P.2d 1129, 1134 (1977), specifi-
cally rejected the idea that either MONT. CONST. art I § 28 or R.C.M. 1947, § 95-2227(3)
(Supp. 1977) could be the basis for not allowing this form of impeachment.
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ever been convicted of a felony" to be asked of persons currently
under state supervision. But the principal reason the Commission
rejected this type of impeachment is its low probative value in rela-
tion to credibility. The Commission did not accept the premise that
willingness to commit a crime can readily be translated into a will-
ingness to lie as a witness, nor did it accept the idea that the proof
of conviction of a crime relating to or probative of credibility should
be allowed as a matter of convenient proof. It is the specific instance
of conduct underlying the conviction which is relevant to credibility,
and this is what is to be used to impeach under Rule 608. This bars
impeachment for crimes not relating to credibility, which prevents
severe embarrassment to witnesses, prevents confusion among ju-
rors who see no relation between conviction of crime and credibility,
and prevents prejudice against witnesses by jurors who view with
distrust testimony from persons convicted of a felony, even though
not related to credibility in that case.
Rule 610 provides the rule that evidence of religious beliefs is
not admissible for proving this has any effect on a witness' credibil-
ity. The Rule is identical to the Federal Rule and does away with
any possibility that nonbelief in a supreme being may be used to
show a person is not credible or the reverse, that belief in a supreme
being shows inherent credibility. The Advisory Committee's Note to
Rule 610198 indicates this is not intended to bar inquiry into mem-
bership in a church or group where that church, group or a member
thereof is a party to the case and the inquiry goes to bias.
C. Conduct of Trial and Examination of Witnesses
Rule 611(a) states the general rule controlling the conduct of
trial and examination of witnesses by placing this power with the
trial'court. The court's power allows control over the mode and order
of interrogating witnesses and presentation of evidence. As the
Commission Comment indicates, mode of interrogation refers to the
form of question, whether asking for specific answers or general
narration, and order of interrogation, while presentation refers to
the normal manner in which the parties present evidence and alter-
ation from that norm. The subdivision also states three goals which
courts should keep in mind in the conduct of trials: first, to "make
the interrogation and presentation effective for the ascertainment of
truth," second, to "avoid needless consumption of time," and third,
to "protect witnesses from harassment or undue embarrassment."
Rule 611(b), governing scope of cross-examination, states in its
first sentence the standard rule that cross-examination should be
196. 56 F.R.D. 183, 272 (1972).
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limited to the subject matter of the direct examination and matters
affecting credibility. However, the second sentence allows the court
to permit inquiry during cross-examination as to new matters as if
on direct. As the Commission Comment indicates the first sentence
is to allow the normal order of proof during trial, that is to have the
party with the burden of persuasion present evidence, and the other
side present its evidence. However, if the trial court believes that
there would be a savings of time or that it should allow complete
questioning of a witness, the second sentence allows the cross-
examiner to exceed the scope of ordinary cross-examination. Since
this is allowed, the Commission felt it imperative that matters so
developed should be allowed as proof of any fact in issue in the case,
hence the addition of clause (2).
As noted in the discussion of Rule 607, these two Rules have the
effect of abolishing the doctrine of sponsorship of witnesses. There
are five rules associated with that doctrine which are superseded by
the Rules: first, the rule that a party may not impeach his own
witness is abolished by Rule 607(a); second, the rule that a party is
bound by the testimony of his witnesses is abolished by Rule 607(b);
third, the rule that parties may not exceed the normal scope of
cross-examination is clarified by Rule 611(b)(1); fourth, the rule not
allowing a party to make out his case on cross-examination is abol-
ished by Rule 611(b)(2); and finally the combination of these four
rules in Montana case law that had resulted in a rule that if a party
exceeds the scope of cross-examination he makes the witness his
own, is bound by his testimony, and cannot impeach him, is abol-
ished by Rules 607 and 611(b). (See Commission Comment to Rule
611(b).)
Rule 611(c), concerned with the use of leading questions, fol-
lows the general rule not allowing them because they result in the
questioner placing the desired answer in evidence, not the witness,
and raising the danger of acquiescence in a false suggestion." 7 Of
course, there are exceptions to the general rule concerned with pro-
per development of testimony of hostile, unwilling or biased wit-
nesses, children, adult witnesses with communication problems,
witnesses whose memory is exhausted, or bringing out undisputed
preliminary matters.' The Rule changes the law to the extent that
it allows hostile witnesses, adverse parties or witnesses identified
with adverse parties to be automatically treated as hostile. 99 In
permitting leading questions in what is a cross-examination type of
situation, the Rule uses the word "ordinarily" and so would not
197. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 8.
198. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 611(c), 56 F.R.D. 183, 275-76 (1972).
199. Id. at 276.
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permit leading questions during the cross-examination of a witness
hostile to the opponent, for this is essentially a direct examination.
Rule 611(d) and (e) were added to the Federal Rule to accomo-
date the existing Montana statutes"' concerning re-examination
and recall of witnesses and the right of an adverse party to be pres-
ent at the examination of witnesses.
Rule 612 concerns the procedural aspects of what may be done
with a writing used to refresh the memory of witnesses. It is crucial
that practitioners remember the difference between these writings
and writings which are a recorded recollection, treated as a hearsay
exception in Rule 803(5). As the Commission Comment indicates,
a witness refreshing his memory has an independent recollection of
the event, but needs his memory jogged. Once the writing is referred
to, the witness should be capable of testifying without it. Therefore,
the witness' memory and not the writing is going into evidence. A
recorded recollection under Rule 803(5) is used when a witness who
has no independent recollection, but who had, at a previous time
when the event was fresh in his memory, written down the events.
The statement is read to the jury, rather than being testified to from
memory. A foundation is required under Rule 803(5) to allow this
to be done.
The purpose of Rule 612 is "to promote the search of credibility
and memory"2 0' and to insure that the witness is in fact refreshing
his memory from the writing, not testifying from it, by testing the
credibility of that memory with the use of the writing in cross-
examination. In order to fulfill its purposes the Rule allows the
adverse party the right to have the writing produced, to inspect it,
to cross-examine the witness using it, and to introduce into evidence
portions which relate to the testimony of the witness. The Rule also
has provisions for excising irrelevant portions and preserving the
writing for appellate courts in the event rulings of this nature are
challenged. Finally, the Rule has provisions penalizing the party
who does not produce writings pursuant to the Rule, including pro-
visions to strike the testimony, to declare mistrial, or to make any
order justice requires.
Rule 613 sets out the requirements of examining witnesses using
writings or prior statements they have made. It has the effect of
abolishing two common law rules, in subdivision (a), the rule in
Queen Caroline's Case requiring the witness' own written state-
ments to be shown to him before examination about them, and in
subdivision (b), the common law rule requiring a foundation before
200. R.C.M. 1947, §§ 93-1901-10 and 93-401-3.
201. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 612, 56 F.R.D. 183, 227 (1977).
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impeaching a witness with his prior inconsistent statement. The
Advisory Committee indicates that each of the changes is intended
to allow more effective cross-examination and impeachment by not
allowing the witness the opportunity to plan a response to what
appear to be inconsistencies. 202 Subdivision (a) does provide that
opposing counsel shall be shown written statements used to examine
witnesses to insure that they do say what the examiner purports
them to say. Subdivision (b) changes the usual foundation require-
ments long recognized in Montana °0 which require the witness to be
asked whether or not he made a particular statement at a certain
time, in a certain place with certain persons present. It requires only
that extrinsic evidence may not be used to prove a prior inconsistent
statement unless the party is afforded an opportunity to explain or
deny the statement and the opposite party is allowed to interrogate
him thereon. The change is to one of a less formal foundation and,
most importantly, time sequence, since the opportunity to explain
need not occur before the impeachment.0 4 The subdivision also in-
cludes language "or the interests of justice otherwise require" which
could allow the court to waive any requirements to the introduction
of the prior inconsistent statement if the witness is unavailable to
explain the statement.205 These statements may also be considered
as substantive evidence under Rule 801(d)(1)(A).
Rule 614 provides the court with the power to call and interro-
gate witnesses on its own motion, or at the suggestion of a party.
As the Commission Comment indicates, this Rule is usually invoked
where neither side wishes to call an undesirable witness. The court
can solve this problem by calling him itself. While the Commission
does not intend the rule to allow courts to join in as an adversary,
the court should be allowed to do what it can to get at the truth .2
The Rule also provides that when the court is interrogating wit-
nesses, it should be careful to be and to appear impartial. Objec-
tions to questions asked may be made when the jury is not present.
Rule 615 provides the rule allowing the sequestration of wit-
nesses, but as the Commission Comment notes, changes Montana
law by allowing this procedure to be a right of the party rather than
within discretion of the court. The purpose of the Rule is to provide
an effective "means of discouraging and exposing fabrication, inac-
curacy and collusion." 07 The Rule does not authorize exclusion of
202. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVD. 613, 56 F.R.D. 183, 278-79 (1972).
203. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-1901-12.
204. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 613(b), 56 F.R.D. 183, 279 (1972).
205. Id.
206. State v. Mickelson, - Mont. -, 565 P.2d 308, 311 (1977); State v. McCon-
ville, 64 Mont. 302, 304, 209 P. 987, 989 (1922).
207. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 615, 56 F.R.D. 183, 280 (1972).
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three categories of witnesses: parties, representatives of parties
which are not natural persons, or persons whose presence is shown
by a party to be essential to the presentation of his case. Note that
the last category changes the case law rule in Montana"' that police
officers, sheriff's deputies and law enforcement officers are automat-
ically exempt from exclusion.
VII. ARTICLE VII. OPINIONS AND EXPERT TESTIMONY
A. Lay Opinion
The traditional lay opinion rule, the rule prohibiting lay wit-
nesses from testifying as to their opinions, is based on the idea that
an opinion of a witness is merely his belief and is not based on fact
or personal knowledge. °0 However, when a witness gives a descrip-
tion, the distinction between "opinions" and "facts" is often diffi-
cult for courts to make. 10 As a result, courts created many excep-
tions to the rule. Lay witnesses were allowed to give opinions when
describing "identity, handwriting, quantity, value, weight, mea-
sure, time, distance, velocity, form, size, age, strength, heat, cold,
sickness, and health . ..
Rule 701 replaces the traditional opinion rule and its excep-
tions. It allows lay opinions but provides two safeguards: first, that
the opinion is rationally based on perceived facts, and second, that
the opinion is helpful to an understanding of testimony or facts in
issue. This formulation of the rule is clearly superior to an exclusion-
ary rule riddled with exceptions for admissibility. The safeguards
will exclude opinions which are not based on fact or are not helpful.
Although under this Rule there may be some slight chance of broad
assertions, rather than detailed descriptions, such broad testimony
will be subject to cross-examination and argument to demonstrate
its weakness." 2
Rule 704, opinions on the ultimate issue, applies to lay as well
as expert testimony. This Rule allows testimony in the form of an
opinion concerning the ultimate issue in the case. However, opin-
ions which tell the jury what result to reach will not be allowed. 1 3
208. E.g., State v. Meidinger, 160 Mont. 310, 320, 502 P.2d 58, 64 (1972).
209. MCCORMICK, supra note 22, at 22.
210. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVD. 701, 56 F.R.D. 183, 281 (1972); Terri-
tory v. Clayton, 8 Mont. 1, 12, 19 P. 293, 297-98 (1888).
211. State v. Trueman, 34 Mont. 249, 253, 85 P. 1024, 1025-26 (1906).
212. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvED. 701, 56 F.R.D. 183, 282 (1972).
213. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 704, 56 F.R.D. 183, 285 (1972).
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B. Expert Testimony
There are three Rules applying exclusively to expert testimony:
Rule 702, providing when expert testimony may be given, and quali-
fications of an expert; Rule 703, providing which facts or data may
be the basis of an expert's opinion; and Rule 705, requiring disclo-
sure of those facts or data.
Rule 702 sets out broad standards for allowing expert testi-
mony. It allows "scientific, technical, or other specialized knowl-
edge" which would assist the trier of fact. These standards are con-
sistent with Montana law allowing expert opinion in areas "not
within the range of ordinary training or intelligence . . .",214 or on
questions "involving matters too complex to be readily grasped by
the average mind .. "215 The qualifications of a person to be an
expert are: "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or educa-
tion. . . ." These are also consistent with existing Montana law.'"
It is interesting to note that the expert may testify as to his opinion
or otherwise. This addition is in accord with the Article VII policy
of making expert testimony helpful to the trier of fact. It is also
consistent with one Montana case" 7 which held that witnesses who
were qualified as experts in accounting and bookkeeping could ex-
plain the meaning of various entries because this information was
enlightening to the jury.
Ordinarily, expert testimony must be based on facts or data
perceived by the expert himself, facts or data made known to the
expert through other witnesses in the trial, or a hypothetical ques-
tion." ' Rule 703 expands the law in this area by adding a new provi-
sion that an expert may base his opinion on information reasonably
relied upon by experts in that particular field, and that information
need not be admissible in evidence. This expansion has already
been made in Montana for physicians, experts in land valuation,
and highway patrolmen qualified as experts in accident reconstruc-
tion. Thus, the only change this Rule brings to Montana law is its
application to all experts. That is, now all experts may base their
opinions on inadmissible evidence but the information they use for
a basis must be of a type reasonably relied upon by other experts
in their respective fields.
Rule 705 treats disclosure to the court, jury, and adverse parties
of information used as the basis of an opinion. The usual practice
214. Kelly v. John R. Dailey Co., 56 Mont. 63, 79, 181 P. 326, 331 (1916).
215. Wibaux Realty Co. v. Northern Pac. Ry., 101 Mont. 126, 139, 54 P.2d 1175, 1181
(1935).
216. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-27(9).
217. State v. Cassill, 70 Mont. 443, 448, 227 P. 49, 55 (1924).
218. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVD. 703, 56 F.R.D. 183, 283 (1972).
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is to call upon the expert to answer a hypothetical question which
contains all the facts pertinent to the opinion sought. This practice
has been subject to "a great deal of criticism as encouraging parti-
san bias, affording an opportunity for summing up in the middle of
the case, and as complex and time consuming. '"219 Rule 705 allows
an expert to give his opinion without any prior disclosure of the basis
of his opinion, unless the court determines it would be helpful to do
otherwise. Any points of weakness or controversy in the basis of the
opinion should be brought out on cross-examination,2 0 as provided
in the second sentence of Rule 705.
Finally, Rule 704 allows an expert to give an opinion on the
ultimate issue in the case. The Rule is consistent with Montana law
which has long allowed such opinions. Of course it does not allow
an opinion which merely tells the jury to reach a particular result
("I think the defendant was negligent"), to reach a legal conclusion,
or to apply the law to the facts; further, the jury may accept or reject
any expert's opinion.2 '
VIII. ARTICLE VIII HEARSAY
It is important to remember at the outset why hearsay evidence
is excluded. When a witness testifies, the trier of fact should be
allowed to consider his perception, memory, narration, and sincer-
ity.222 Therefore, in order to aid the trier of fact and ensure trustwor-
thiness, three conditions are imposed: testimony is given under
oath, in the presence of the trier of fact (to allow the demeanor of
the witness to be observed), and subject to cross-examination. .
Cross-examination is the most effective means to expose imperfec-
tions in perception, memory, narration, and sincerity.224 But, of
course, hearsay statements which are offered into evidence were not
originally made under oath, in the presence of the trier of fact and,
most importantly, were not subject to cross-examination. Therefore,
because its reliability cannot be adequately tested, hearsay is gener-
ally excluded. Certain types of hearsay statements found to be in-
herently trustworthy are, however, admitted as exceptions.
Article VIII is organized to help understand the hearsay rules.
First, Rule 801 states important definitions of basic terms and of
statements which are not hearsay. Rule 802 states that hearsay is
not generally admissible. Rules 803 and 804 state the exceptions to
219. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 705, 56 F.R.D. 183, 285 (1972).
220. Id. at 286.
221. Commission Comment to MONT. R. Evm. 704.
222. Advisory Committee's Note to FEr. R. Evm. art. VIII, 56 F.R.D. 183, 288 (1972).
223. Id.
224. Id. at 289.
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the hearsay rule. Rule 805 applies to hearsay within hearsay. Rule
806 applies to attacking or supporting the credibility of makers of
hearsay statements.
A. Definitions, Statements Which are Not Hearsay, General Rule
Rule 801 defines "statement" and "declarant" in subdivisions
(a) and (b), which are necessary parts of the definition of hearsay
in subdivision (c). There are two types of "statements". The first
and most obvious type is an oral or written assertion. It is important
to emphasize that written evidence is usually hearsay, and admissi-
ble only under an exception. The second type of statement is the
nonverbal conduct of a person intended by him as an assertion. This
type will seldom be used. If the conduct is intended to achieve some
other result than to communicate, there is no likelihood of intent
to deceive, faulty perception, memory, narration or lack of sincerity.
But when a person intends to communicate through non-verbal con-
duct, such as the nod of a head or waive of a hand, a message may
be conveyed. That message was not made under oath, in the pres-
ence of the trier of fact, nor subject to cross-examination. Therefore,
conduct which is a substitute for speech is included in the rule
against hearsay because its reliability cannot be tested.
Since subdivision (b) simply defines "declarant" as a person
who makes a statement, human communcation is required. Subdi-
vision (c) defines hearsay as "a statement, other than one made by
the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evi-
dence to prove the truth of the matter asserted." Besides nonverbal
conduct,2 5 already mentioned, there are two types of testimony
which could arguably be hearsay. The first type is testimony given
by a witness in court proceedings, which is specifically excluded
from the definition of hearsay because such testimony complies with
all the ideal conditions for testing its reliability.22 The second ex-
cluded type is testimony which is not offered to prove the truth of
the matter asserted, but merely to prove that the statement was
made. It is excluded from the hearsay definition because there is no
need to test the reliability of the perception, memory, narration, or
sincerity of the maker of the statement. Indeed the truth of his
statement is not at issue. Further, the reliability of the witness who
is testifying that the statement was made is adequately tested. His
testimony is being given in a court proceeding. But making the
distinction between testimony offered for its truth and that offered
merely to prove the statement was made is perhaps the most diffi-
225. 4 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE, 801-57 (1975).
226. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 801(c), 56 F.R.D. 183, 295 (1972).
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cult problem in determining the admissibility of the potential hear-
say testimony. An example may be helpful. On the issue of the
sanity of X, testimony is offered by a witness that X made the
statement, "I am the King of England." Here the statement is not
being offered to prove its truth, i.e., that X is King. It is offered to
prove that the statement was made, so that X can be shown to be
insane. There is obviously no need to test the reliability of X's
statement. But when the witness testifies that X made the state-
ment, he is in a court proceeding and subject to the three ideal
conditions for testing reliability, and the testimony is not hearsay.
Rule 801(d) defines types of prior statement as not being hear-
say. The first clause provides that a statement is not hearsay if the
declarant is testifying at the trial or hearing, subject to cross-
examination, and the statement is either inconsistent with his testi-
mony, consistent with his testimony but offered to support it, or one
of identification. The effect is that all other prior statements are
hearsay and are admissible only if a hearsay exception applies. Ar-
guably, a witness should be allowed to testify to all of his own
statements. But Rule 801(d) represents a compromise between al-
lowing all prior statements, which could lead to trial by prepared
statement rather than testimony, and allowing no prior statement,
which is not sensible in the particular instances set out in the
Rule.2 1
First, the Rule makes prior inconsistent statements admissible
as substantive evidence. The instruction providing that a prior in-
consistent statement can only be considered for impeachment pur-
poses is no longer correct. Note that Rule 613 alters the foundation
requirements for prior inconsistent statements. Second, prior con-
sistent statements offered to rebut an express or implied charge of
fabrication, improper influence or motive are admissible. These
statements are admitted to explain an apparent inconsistency or
influence which arose after the original statement, by showing that
the current testimony is consistent with the earlier statement.
Third, statements of identification made by the witness after per-
ceving a person are admissible. These statements are admitted be-
cause prior identification is more reliable than trial identification. 28
Identification testimony is rarely a hearsay problem.
The second clause of Rule 801(d) applies to admissions, state-
ments made by a party which are offered against him by his adver-
sary. These statements have always been substantive evidence. 29
There are five types of admissions allowed under this clause. The
227. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 801(d).
228. Id.
229. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(2). 52
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first type of admission is the party's own statement, in either his
own or representative capacity. Admissions made in a representa-
tive capacity were not previously known in Montana.130 The second
type of admission is adoptive admissions, statements made by one
other than the party but adopted by the party. Where the adoption
of this statement is accomplished through silence, the label "tacit
admission" is often applied. Although statutory authority would
appear to be broader,23' tacit admissions are the only adoptive ad-
mission recognized under existing Montana case law. There is diffi-
culty in admitting tacit admissions in criminal cases where the
accused has the right to remain silent. 232 The third and fourth types
of admissions are those by agents of the principal who is a party.
Clause (C) states the standard rule allowing admissions by agents
authorized to make such statements; this rule has been justly criti-
cized "since few principals employ agents for the purpose of making
damaging statements .... ,,23 As a solution to this problem, clause
(D) states a more liberal rule. It allows statements of any agent if
the statement concerns a matter within the scope of his agency and
was made during the existence of the agency relationship. This is a
change because former Montana law did not allow unauthorized
statements, and authorized statements were allowed only if part of
the res gestae.2 34 The final type of admission is that made by co-
conspirators. It states the generally recognized requirements that in
order to be admissible, the statements must be in furtherance and
during the course of the conspiracy.
Rule 802 expresses the basic provision that hearsay is not ad-
missible, except as otherwise provided by statute, these Rules, or
other rules applicable in the courts of this state. Surprisingly, until
the adoption of Rule 802 Montana law did not express the hearsay
rule. A few Montana cases235 however, have found a section dealing
with personal knowledge to have done so. Finally, the exception
clause is intended to recognize that the law admits hearsay evidence
where exceptions to the hearsay rule exist.
B. Hearsay Exceptions
Wigmore's theory provides the best starting point for under-
standing hearsay exceptions. His theory is that there are two under-
230. Id.
231. Id.
232. 56 F.R.D. 183, 298 (1972).
233. Id.
234. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 801(d)(2).
235. R.C.M. 1947, § 93-401-2, construed in Patterson v. Halterman, 161 Mont. 278, 282,
505 P.2d 905, 907 (1973) and Wilson v. Davis, 110 Mont. 356, 366, 103 P.2d 149, 153 (1940).
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lying principles or requirements of any hearsay exception, the ne-
cessity principle and the principle of circumstantial guarantee of
trustworthiness. 3 ' The necessity principle implies that hearsay evi-
dence is necessary, even though untested by oath, presence of the
trier of fact, and cross-examination. That is, unless the hearsay
evidence is received, any benefit to be gained from information
contained in it will be lost. Wigmore notes that there may be two
reasons why the benefit may be lost. The first and strongest reason
is that the hearsay declarant may not be available to give the testi-
mony; no one else could give the testimony. Second, hearsay state-
ments may be more accurate than statements made at trial by
witnesses who are merely relying on their memory. Thus, by exclud-
ing hearsay testimony, the judicial system loses the benefit of more
accurate evidence. 37 The second principle, circumstantial guaran-
tee of trustworthiness, is that under some circumstances the hearsay
statement is probably as accurate and trustworthy as testimony
given under the three ideal conditions of oath, presence of trier of
fact, and cross-examination. 38 Finally, Wigmore recognized that
these two principles work together on a sliding scale. They are not
to be applied with equal force with each hearsay exception.
The two rules containing hearsay exceptions can be explained
in terms of Wigmore's principles. Rule 803 provides an exception for
statements whose circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness is so
high that the availability of the hearsay declarant is of no conse-
quence. That is, this is the type of hearsay which is at least as
valuable as the memory of the witness at trial; therefore, the testi-
mony is admissible regardless of whether or not the declarant is
unavailable and the necessity principle is satisfied. Rule 804 con-
tains hearsay exceptions which are of a lesser guarantee of trustwor-
thiness. Therefore, the necessity principle must be satisfied; the
testimony is admissible only if the hearsay declarant is unavailable.
There are twenty-four exceptions in Rule 803. It is sufficient to
note that the circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness of each
exception is explained in the Commission Comment. The excep-
tions may be grouped as follows: (1) through (4) are spontaneous
declarations; (5) through (18) are entries in documents; (19) through
(21) are declarations concerning reputation; and (22) and (23) are
judgments. The twenty-fourth exception is one allowing hearsay
evidence to be admitted if the statement has circumstantial guaran-
tees of trustworthiness similar to those contained in the enumerated
236. 5 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 1421 (Chadbourn Rev. 1974).
237. Id.
238. Id. at § 1422.
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exceptions, and is more liberal than its Federal counterpart. (See
Commission Comment to this Rule.)
The first group of exceptions embraces part of the res gestae or
transaction rule. The Montana version of that rule is much broader
than an exception to the hearsay rule.239 The rationale behind this
group of exceptions is that statements made at or near the time of
a transaction, by persons observing it, are quite accurate. When
another person relates the statement at trial, his testimony is as
likely to be accurate as the memory of the hearsay declarant would
be if he were required to testify. The second group of exceptions
recognizes that records or documents of an event, are likely to be
more accurate than the memory of a person who could testify to the
same facts contained in the writing. It is important to note that
Article VIII governs the hearsay challenge to the admissiblity of
writings, Article IX controls authentication of writings, and finally
Article X requires production of the original. The provisions of these
three articles must be met before any writing may be admitted. For
example, a public record may be admissible as a hearsay exception
under Rule 803(8), but it must also be authenticated under Rule
901(b)(7); moreover, copies of it may be introduced under Rule 1005
as an exception to Rule 1002 requiring production of the original.
The third group of exceptions governs the admissibility of state-
ments concerning reputation. Ordinarily, reputation statements,
i.e., testimony as to what others in the community say about a
person's character trait, are not challenged as hearsay. But since
hearsay is necessarily involved in determining reputation, this ex-
ception is included to ensure that reputation evidence will be admit-
ted. Finally, certain judgments are admitted as proof of their under-
lying facts, which have been proven under the three ideal condi-
tions.
As mentioned, since statements under Rule 804 have a lesser
circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness, those exceptions re-
quire that the declarant be unavailable before the statement is ad-
missible. The definition of "unavailable" is provided in subdivision
(a) of the rule. It lists five instances in which the witness may be
considered unavailable. They are to be applied uniformly to the
hearsay exceptions which follow. It is important to note that physi-
cal presence of the declarant is not the criterion used to determine
unavailability, but the test is whether or not the evidence contained
in the statement can be elicited from the witness without introduc-
ing the hearsay statement. The first three instances of unavailabil-
ity are examples of this concept. If a witness has a privilege and is
239. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EvID. 803(1).
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so exempted from testifying, or persists in refusing to testify despite
an order of the court to do so, or testifies to a lack of memory, the
witness is physically present but is not a source from which the
evidence can be elicited. The last two instances provide the more
common criteria of unavailability-death or physical or mental ill-
ness or infirmity, and absence from the jurisdiction. If any one of
these five instances of unavailability listed in subdivision (a) exists,
then one of the five hearsay exceptions in subdivision (b) of this rule
may be applied. The first exception in that subsection, former testi-
mony, is different from the federal exception; it supplies a more
liberal rule. Former testimony in civil actions is allowed if the mo-
tive, interest, and opportunity of a party against whom the testi-
mony is offered is similar to those of any party cross-examining the
witnesses at a former action. In criminal cases, the accused's con-
frontation right prevents this liberal rule from being applied. In-
stead, the exception allows former testimony only if the same party,
that is, the party against whom it is currently being offered, had a
similar motive and opportunity to cross-examine the witness at a
former action. This differentiation between civil and criminal cases
is in accord with Montana cases on use of former testimony. 40 Since
former testimony is given under two of the three ideal conditions,
oath and cross-examination, its guarantee of trustworthiness is ob-
viously strong. However, the requirement of unavailability is still
applied in order to encourage live testimony.
The second hearsay exception in Rule 804(b) is the classic,
long-standing, dying declaration. The exception is captioned
"statement under belief of impending death" rather than "dying
declaration" because the declarant's death is no longer necessary for
this exception; he need only be unavailable under one of the instan-
ces in subdivision (a). Just as at common law, however, the state-
ment must be made while the person believes death is imminent
and it must be a statement concerning the cause of death. Retaining
these two requirements preserves the guarantee of trustworthiness
for this exception. Contrary to prior law, these statements are now
clearly admissible in civil as well as criminal cases.24'
The third hearsay exception is commonly known as the declara-
tion against interest. These statements are admitted because per-
sons do not ordinarily make such statements unless they are true.
Former Montana law included only statements against pecuniary
and proprietary interests under this exception. This Rule expands
the exception to include statements against social or penal interests
240. Commission Comment to MONT. R. Evm. 804(b).
241. Id.
[Vol. 39
56
Montana Law Review, Vol. 39 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/4
RULES OF EVIDENCE
as well. The fourth exception is similar to Rule 803(19), but expands
the law to allow the statement of an unavailable family member or
intimate friend concerning personal or family history. The final ex-
ception is similar to Rule 803(24); it allows the court to admit hear-
say statements similar to others in Rule 804 if there is a similar
circumstantial guarantee of trustworthiness.
C. Hearsay Within Hearsay and Impeaching Hearsay Declarants
Rule 805 provides a sensible solution to the problem of the
admissibility of a statement which fits one hearsay exception but
contains other hearsay. That solution is to allow the statement with
multiple hearsay to be admitted if each of the particular hearsay
statements would be independently admissible. This Rule is new
Montana law.
Rule 806 allows impeachment or support of the credibility of
hearsay declarants as if they had testified as witnesses. The Rule
also suspends the Rule 613(b) requirement of allowing the witness
to explain or deny inconsistent statements. Obviously, if the declar-
ant is not testifying, there is no opportunity for him to explain or
deny inconsistent statements.
IX. ARTICLE IX. AUTHENTICATION AND IDENTIFICATION
Authentication and identification have several purposes, the
most important of which is ensuring relevance:
Authentication and identification represent a special aspect of re-
levancy. . . .Thus a telephone conversation may be irrelevant
because of an unrelated topic or because the speaker is not identi-
fied. The latter aspect is the one here involved. 4 1
Other purposes include preventing fraudulent or mistaken presenta-
tion of evidence, 43 and providing procedures to remind the trier of
fact both that there must be a connection between documents or
tangible objects and the facts at issue in the case and that there may
be grounds for suspicion that the object or document is not what it
purports to be. This purpose has been criticized. 44 There is valid
criticism that authentication and identification are superfluous or
can make a proponent's case seem weaker in the eyes of the jury. 45
Also, the obstacle to the introduction of forgeries which the require-
242. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 901, 56 F.R.D. 183, 332 (1972).
243. Strong, Liberalizing the Authentication of Private Writings, 52 CORNELL L.Q., 284,
286 (1967).
244. Alexander & Alexander, The Authentication of Documents Requirement: Barrier
to Falsehood or Truth? 10 SAN DIEGO L. REv. 266, 276 (1973).
245. Id.
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ments provide is slight, especially when compared to the time and
expense of authenticating documents which are genuine on their
face.24 In response to these criticisms, the federal drafters adopted
several reforms. First, Rule 901(a) states a general provision for
authentication and identification. Second, Rule 901(b) provides il-
lustrations of that general provision; but this list of illustrations
provides only examples and is not a limitation of the general princi-
ple in subdivision (a) of this rule. Third, Rule 902 provides a list of
documents and writings which are accepted as self-authenticating
when they are essentially genuine on their face. Finally, Rule 903
abolishes the requirement that subscribing witnesses testify to au-
thenticate writings they have signed.
The general provision of Rule 901(a) states that in order for a
writing to be authenticated or a physical object identified, all that
is necessary is a foundation of evidence sufficient to support a find-
ing that the writing or object is what its proponent claims. This
requirement is generally consistent with existing Montana law,
which has required a prima facie showing of a connection between
the object or writing and the facts of the case by either circumstan-
tial or direct evidence. 247
The first illustration, testimony that the matter is what its
proponent claims, is the most easily understood and probably most
often applied of the illustrations in Rule 901(b). The second and
third illustrations apply to lay and expert authentication of hand-
writing; they conform to existing Montana practice. The fourth il-
lustration is- the rule allowing distinctive characteristics and the
like. Besides the reply letter doctrine recognized by Montana law,248
the illustration applies to any other circumstance which indicates
that a particular object is unique and, under the circumstances of
the case, obviously genuine. The fifth and sixth illustrations apply
to voice identification and telephone conversations, and are consis-
tent with existing Montana law.249 The seventh illustration applies
to authentication of public records; it retains the standard method
of authentication-simply presenting evidence that the document
was recorded or filed in a public office where it would normally be
kept. The eighth illustration provides a slight change in the law of
authentication of ancient documents, although the same purpose as
existed under former Montana law is fulfilled in the Rule.250 The
ninth illustration allows authentication of results of a process or
246. Id. at 277.
247. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EvID. 901(a).
248. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 901(b)(4).
249. Id.
250. Id.
[Vol. 39
58
Montana Law Review, Vol. 39 [1978], Iss. 1, Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.umt.edu/mlr/vol39/iss1/4
RULES OF EVIDENCE
system, such as X-rays, or computers."5 ' The last illustration allows
any other method of authentication allowed by statute or rule of
court.
Rule 902 lists ten categories of writings or documents which are
to be admitted without any foundation" . . . for reasons of policy,
perhaps more often because practical considerations reduce the pos-
sibility of unauthenticity to a very small dimension." 2 ' This does
not, of course, preclude a challenge to authenticity. These categories
generally require the same authentication as in the past, but the
mere showing that the document fits within the category removes
the requirement for presentation of further foundation evidence in
court. The first three categories are domestic public documents
under seal, those not under seal, and foreign public documents. The
fourth category allows certified copies of public records in the first
three categories to be self-authenticating. The fifth category allows
books, pamphlets or other publications issued by a public authority
to be self-authenticating. The sixth category is a change in Montana
law, allowing newspapers and periodicals to be self-authenticating.
It is a sensible change, as a forged or false newspaper or periodical
is extremely unlikely.20 The seventh category is also a change in
Montana law, allowing trade inscriptions, tags, or labels affixed in
the course of business to be self-authenticating. " Acknowledged
documents are self-authenticating under the eighth subdivision.
Commercial paper and related documents, already allowed under
the Uniform Commercial Code, are self-authenticating under the
ninth category. Recognition is given to self-authenticating provi-
sions contained elsewhere in existing Montana law in the tenth and
last category.
As previously noted, Rule 903 abolishes the requirement that
subscribing witnesses must testify to authenticate. The Rule does,
however, defer to any statute specifically requiring the subscribing
witness to testify.
X. ARTICLE X. CONTENTS OF WRITINGS, RECORDINGS AND
PHOTOGRAPHS
Article X governs what is commonly known as "the best evi-
dence rule." Since the Advisory Committee believes that is a mis-
leading name,155 and for the sake of clarity, it will be "the rule
requiring the production of an original writing." The reasons for this
251. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 901(b)(9), 56 F.R.D. 183, 335 (1972).
252. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evm. 902, 56 F.R.D. 183, 337 (1972).
253. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 902(6).
254. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 902(7).
255. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. Evw. 1001, 56 F.R.D. 183, 341 (1972).
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Rule include the importance of exact words in a document (a slight
difference affects parties' rights); accuracy; prevention of fraud; and
authenticity (which a copy would not have).25 One commentator
argues that with today's broad discovery provisions, the rule requir-
ing the production of the original is unlikely to be useful, and should
therefore be abolished.257 The Advisory Committee's position is that
the rule is useful, for example, when a document is outside the
jurisdiction and not discoverable, or in criminal cases."8 The Article
contains several provisions broadening the rule to ease its applica-
tion where it is not needed but to retain it where it is needed. Rule
1001 provides definitions; Rule 1002 states the basic rule; 1003 is an
exception for duplicates; 1004 lists general exceptions to the Rule;
1005 is an exception for public records; 1006 allows summaries; and
1007 is an exception for written admissions of a party.
The definitions in Rule 1001 are those applied throughout Arti-
cle X. First, the definition of writing or recording covers any type
of information storing system, ranging from the usual documents to
any form of electronic recording. Second, photographs are defined
to include all types, including X-rays, video tapes, and motion pic-
tures. Third, originals are defined to include not only the writing
itself, but also any "counterpart intended to have the same effect
by a person executing or issuing it." Thus, the duplicate original
rule is included in the concept of original.?0 Original also includes
the negative or any print of a photograph, or any printout readable
by sight from a computer or similar device. Fourth, duplicate is
defined as a counterpart produced by the same impression as the
original, or by photographic, mechanical, chemical or other means
of reproduction. The definition of duplicate is particularly impor-
tant under Rule 1003, because it makes duplicates admissible to
nearly the same extent as an original. The last definition, entries in
the regular course of business, is not found in the Federal Rule, but
already exists by statute in Montana. It was adopted to ensure that
this useful statutory exception to the rule requiring the production
of the original will still be followed. The Rule applies to copies made
by manual or mechanical means at or near the time of the transac-
tion they record, usually taken from several originals and trans-
ferred to another type of record. Duplicates, on the other hand,
cannot be manually copied from the original. Both this definition
and the definition of duplicate are incorporated in Rule 1003.
256. 5 WEINSTEIN & BERGER, WEINSTEIN'S EVIDENCE 1002-05 (1975).
257. Brown, Authentication and Contents of Writings, 1969 LAW & Soc. ORD. 611, 612,
617 & n. 44.
258. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 1001, 56 F.R.D. 183, 341 (1972).
259. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 1001(3).
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Rule 1002 states the basic rule that if a proponent of evidence
wishes to prove the content of a writing, recording, or photograph,
the original is required, except as otherwise provided. It is impor-
tant to note that the mere fact that an event was recorded does not
mean that the writing upon which it was recorded is needed to prove
the event, but that when" . . . the event is sought to be proved by
the written record, the rule applies." 60 It only applies to photo-
graphs in a few important instances. It is also important to note that
the Rule does not apply to photographs when they are used for
illustrative purposes only."' The Rule applies to photographs used
in cases of copyright, defamation, or invasion of privacy, or where
the photograph has "independent probative value, e.g., automatic
photograph of a bank robber." '
Rule 1003 is the first exception to the rule requiring the produc-
tion of the original writing to prove its contents. This exception
allows two types of writings to be admitted "to the same extent as
the original" unless a genuine question of authenticity of the origi-
nal is raised, or it would be unfair to admit the writing, or it is not
allowed by statute. As mentioned, the types of writing are dupli-
cates, as defined in Rule 1001(4), and copies of entries in the regular
course of business, as defined in Rule 1001(5). The addition of copies
of entries in the regular course of business and the reference to the
possible statutory disallowance are changes from the Federal Rule,
making it comply with existing Montana law.2"3 The liberal admis-
sion of duplicates, the most common of which are photocopies, is an
expansion of Montana law. It is a sensible expansion because the
purposes of the rule requiring the production of the original are
satisfied by a duplicate which is accurate and genuine.264
Rule 1004 provides the second group of exceptions to the rule
requiring the production of the original; these four distinct excep-
tions contained in the Rule are generally accepted law. The first
allows any other evidence of the contents if the original is lost or
destroyed; the second allows it if the original is not obtainable; the
third allows other evidence if the original is in the possession of the
opponent and after notice he does not produce it; and the fourth
allows other evidence if the writing is not closely related to a control-
ling issue, or proves a collateral matter. The fourth exception is new
to Montana law, but the other three are consistent with statutory
and case law.25
260. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 1002, 56 F.R.D. 183, 342 (1972).
261. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EwqD. 1001(2).
262. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EvID. 1002, 56 F.R.D. 183, 342 (1972).
263. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 1003.
264. Advisory Committee's Note to FED. R. EVID. 1003, 56 F.R.D. 183, 343 (1972).
265. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EviD. 1004.
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Rule 1005 is the third exception to the rule requiring the pro-
duction of the original. It provides that the contents of public re-
cords may be proven by a certified copy or by a copy testified to as
correct. This exception is in accord with the public policy of keeping
such records in the custody of the public official whose duty it is to
safeguard them."' The second sentence of the Rule, allowing other
evidence if a copy is not available could be an expansion of existing
Montana law. 67
Rule 1006 is the fourth exception to the rule requiring the pro-
duction of the originals. It allows summaries of voluminous originals
to be introduced, although it requires the original to be available to
the parties and the court for inspection. This exception is also con-
sistent with existing Montana law.28
The final exception to the rule requiring production of the origi-
nal is Rule 1007. It allows the contents of writings to be proved by
the testimony or deposition of the party against whom it is offered,
without accounting for the original. This change to Montana law is
certainly a sensible improvement to the law of evidence. Indeed, the
main purpose of the rule requiring production of the original is the
protection of the adverse parties, but if those parties admit the
contents of the writings, there is no need to produce them. 26
The final Rule in Article X, Rule 1008, simply provides that the
court shall determine whether or not foundational requirements of
this Article are fulfilled and shall determine the admissibility of
extrinsic evidence to prove the contents of original documents.
266. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVlD. 1005.
267. Id.
268. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 1006.
269. Commission Comment to MONT. R. EVID. 1007.
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